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                                                                                           Abstract 
Rwandan history is marked by ethnic divisions and conflicts, mainly between the two rival 
tribes, the Tutsis and the Hutus. The climax of these conflicts was the 1994 genocide against 
Tutsis in which more than half a million Tutsis and moderate Hutus lost their lives. The 
Churches were deeply involved in the atrocities that were committed in the genocide. Every 
year in April, there is an official commemoration of the genocide. Eighteen years have passed 
since the genocide left the country in complete desolation. The concern of this study is 
whether or not there has been any transformation within the country since that time. Prior to 
1994, the State played a major architect in the conspiracies that led to the genocide. Post-
genocide Rwanda has changed, in that it has abolished ethnic based identification, and has 
been promoting national unity and reconciliation as seen in government legislation, mainly 
the Constitution. However, the post-genocide government is criticised largely for restricting 
political involvement through a form of dictatorship and control by one party, Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF), the leading party since the end of the genocide, and which is regarded 
as being dominated by Tutsis. Apart from the registered political parties that operate on the 
basis of consensus in a forum, there are also opposition political parties that are not included 
in this forum. These opposition parties are dominated by Hutus and a few Tutsi RPF former 
members who are indifferent to the current Government. The consensual democracy of 
Kwasi Wiredu is used in this study to evaluate the state of democracy in post-genocide 
Rwanda. The Roman Catholic Church (RCC) had been a remarkably dominant factor in 
Rwandan history. It is widely documented that the Church played a significant role in the 
creation of ethnic division since colonialism and was prominently involved in the atrocities 
committed in the genocide. After the genocide, the RCC has maintained an indifferent 
relationship with the post-genocide Rwandan government. The Church has been criticised for 
having failed to apologise for its role in the genocide. On the other hand, although the Church 
has lost many of its members due to its role in the genocide, the Church is still influential, 
with 50% of the population still belonging to the RCC in post-genocide Rwanda. The Church 
has also been active in social reconstruction in the post-genocide era. Jesse Mugambi’s 
theology of reconstruction is used in this study for the assessment of the role of Churches in 
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1.1 Introduction  
This chapter introduces the study; by giving an introduction to the context of the study which 
contains summarised demographic information and a brief historical background; and by 
providing a description of the study. That is to say; the motivation, methodology used, and 
the objectives of the study.  
1.2 Background  
1.2.1 Geographical location of Rwanda 
Rwanda, also known as “the land of a thousand hills” is a landlocked country located in the 
central African region, 75 miles south of the equator. Rwanda borders Uganda to the North, 
Burundi to the South, the Democratic Republic of Congo to the West, and Tanzania to the 
East.  
 















Political Map of Rwanda 
 
Source: Maps of the World (http://www.mapsofworld.com)  
 
1.2.2 Historical Background 
 
The political history of Rwanda is very closely linked to the Church and cannot be viewed in 
isolation from the Church, especially the RCC.  
1.2.2.1 The Political Situation Before and During Colonialism 
Rwanda has three ethnic groups, namely: Tutsis, Hutus and Twa. The Tutsis and Hutus are 
the two dominant ethnic groups and have always been at the centre of turmoil and conflict. 
When the colonialists arrived in Rwanda at the end of the 19th Century, there was a 
monarchical type of governance under the minority Tutsi ethnic group that was dominant 
politically and economically. Rwanda was first colonised by Germany before the First World 
War; after Belgium’s conquest against Germany during the First World War, Belgium took 
over the colony (Kirschke 1996:8). Both the RCC and the colonialists worked together with 
the political leadership to gain influence and control over Rwanda. They supported the belief 
that the Tutsis were naturally superior to the Hutus, and thus better suited for leadership 





According to Waller (1996:4), “the Tutsis were regarded as herdsmen, and Hutus as 
agriculturalists. The Twa group was the original settlers of Rwanda between 2000 BC and 
1000 AD.” The Twa group made a living by hunting and gathering in the forests. Waller 
(1996:4) further indicates that Hutus are believed to have migrated to Rwanda about 500 
years after the Twas settled here and formed the majority of the population, 90%. Later, 
between the 16th and 19th centuries AD, the Tutsi also migrated and settled in Rwanda, and 
became the most dominant group both economically and politically. 
Kumalo Simangaliso (2007:216) states that the history of the country as developed by 
Europeans shows that the Tutsis were a Niro-Hamite tribe who migrated from the Ethiopian 
Highlands to Rwanda and Burundi in the 15th century in search of grazing land for their 
cattle. Kumalo further states, citing Tschuy, that although there are no available written 
records, the Hutu group migrated from the Cameroonian savannahs during the 11thcentury and 
settled in Rwanda (Kumalo 2007:216).   
The relationship between Hutus and Tutsis before colonialism is described differently by 
different authors. For example, Gatwa Tharcisse (2005:19) asserts that during certain periods, 
there was a harmonious social, economic and political relationship. However, Kumalo 
(2007:216) indicates that there was a degree of exploitation of the Hutus by the dominant 
Tutsis. 
With different views on the history of the country, others have argued that there are no 
certain facts regarding where the ethnic divisions emerged. According to Kirschke Linda 
(1996:8), some historians suggest that they emerged from different geographical regions, 
whilst others refute the ethnic differentiation based on different geographical origins, by 
arguing that the differences emerged from the same society, and that the ethnic differences 
were based on different ways of living. Kirschke (1996:8) also notes that the division 
between the two groups became evident by the early 18th century. The three ethnic groups are 
not classified as tribes because they share the same language, and there is no specific land 
area allocated to any of the groups (Guillebaud 2005:17). 
Through the monarchical political system, the kingdom was constituted of a central state of 
Mwami (King), from the Tutsi group and sub-states, some of which were led by members of 
the Hutu group (McCullum 1995:3). With the arrival of colonialists and missionaries, both 
the Germans and Belgians glorified the Tutsi group as being superior to the Hutu group. They 





that only a small number of Tutsis held power, while the majority of Tutsis were as poverty-
stricken as the Hutus (Waller 1996:6). 
During the time that identity cards were issued as ordered by the Belgians, individuals had to 
indicate to which ethnic group they belonged. Ethnicity was determined based on the 
ownership of cows; everyone with more than ten cows was deemed to be a Tutsi, since Tutsis 
were herdsmen (Guillebaud 2005:5). Some shifts between the two ethnic groups occurred 
through bribes and through the custom of allowing people to become honorary members of 
the other group (Guillebaud 2005:5).  
Kumalo (2007:217), citing Kastfelt wrote that, “the Catholic white missionaries believed that 
for anyone to convert a nation, he (sic) would need to start with its leaders whether they were 
traditional or colonial because this would guarantee acceptance of the mission by the 
subjects”.  According to Longman Timothy (2001:141), the Catholic missionaries in Rwanda 
aspired to maintain a good relationship with the State. However, this was in their own 
interests. As Longman (2001:141) points out, during the reign of King Yuhi V Musinga, who 
ruled from 1896 to 1931, the Catholic missionaries sought a good relationship with him. 
When the king began to resent the power of the missionaries, they used their influence with 
the Belgian administrators to remove Musinga from power and “replaced him with his most 
pro-Catholic son Mutara III Rudahigwa” (Longman 2001:142). Rudahigwa served from 1931 
until his death in 1959, and the RCC flourished under his reign (Longman 2001:142).    
The first missionaries who arrived in Rwanda were the Catholic White Fathers in 1900. The 
RCC worked hand in hand with their colonial masters to deepen Rwanda’s ethnic divisions. 
As Gourevitch Philip (1998:56-57) notes, the colonialist and the RCC held that the Tutsis 
were of a Hamite origin; a Hamitic myth that was used to enforce ethnic lines. Gatwa 
similarly notes that both the colonial masters and the Catholic missionaries held that the 
Tutsis were Hamites who had arrived in Rwanda from Ethiopia or Egypt, and who were 
naturally superior to the other two Rwandan ethnic groups. They thus ruled through Tutsi 
Kings to promote Western civilisation based on Christianity.         
During the RCC administrative support to the Tutsi kingdom, only Tutsi sons were educated 
in different fields and given skills to become political and social-economic leaders, while the 
Hutus were disadvantaged. The Hutus could usually only obtain spiritual training in Catholic 





Gatwa elsewhere (1998:3) also articulates that the majority, consisting of illiterate and 
impoverished peasants, were exploited by the minority colonial agents and the Tutsi local 
elites through the systems of “Hamite supremacy.”  
Although the RCC dominated the political life of Rwanda, there were also Western Protestant 
missionaries, some of whom refused to take any political stance and others who looked for 
converts from the Rwandan ethnic group that was most favoured by the Westerners.  
Ward Kevin (2008:1) in the Dictionary of African Christian Biography indicates that    
Rwanda was one of the last areas of Africa to receive Christian missionaries. Catholic 
White Fathers established their first mission station in 1900, during the German colonial 
period. German Lutherans began work in 1908 but were expelled during the First World 
War, after which Rwanda became a Belgian mandate of the League of Nations. A 
Belgian Protestant missionary society took over the German mission stations, and new 
societies entered, in particular the Seventh Day Adventists and the Anglicans (the 
"Ruanda Mission"). All these missions looked for converts among the Tutsi ruling class, 
taking for granted the stereotypes which characterised European thinking about Hutu-
Tutsi ethnicity.  
1.2.2.2 From the Monarchy to the Republic, after Colonialism 
The United Nations was formed in 1945 after the Second World War, and called for the 
independence of the colonised nations. In Rwanda the transition process from the colonialists 
to the locals was defective; it was disrupted by conflicts between the Hutus and Tutsis, 
resulting in acts of mass murder in 1959, 1963 and 1973 in which thousands of Tutsis were 
killed. During colonisation many Hutus complained of Tutsi monopolistic leadership and 
began opposing it. Eventually, the Catholic missionaries and the colonialists shifted their 
support from the Tutsis, to the Hutus. There were a number of reasons for this shift, some of 
which are explained below.  
Firstly, some colonialists felt uncomfortable with the idea of promoting racist policies similar 








Secondly, Tutsi leadership sought independence from colonialists,   
The 1Batutsi were perceived to be supporting ideas of radical pan-Africanism that 
were seen as a threat to the Western (Colonialists) interests, as a result the Churches 
and the administration were only too keen to accept the “democratic” and pliant 
alternative offered by the emerging Bahutu elite” (Waller 1996:6). 
Thirdly, Islam became a threat to the RCC as it was attracting Tutsi leadership that was 
seeking independence from Belgium and from the Churches’ domination. On the other hand, 
the RCC had many Hutu converts who made up the majority of the country’s population, and 
who saw the disputes amongst the Tutsi leadership as an opportunity for the Churches and the 
administrators to overcome Tutsi domination and to take over leadership (Kumalo 2007:219). 
Hutu power was then supported by both the RCC and the Belgian administrators in the name 
of advancing democracy, and acting in the interests of the masses. In 1959, the social 
revolution of the Hutu was declared by the RCC. As mentioned above, Gatwa (1998:3) states 
that the illiterate and impoverished majority was exploited through the Hamite supremacy 
system. He adds that this exploitation was also through Rubanda Nyamwinshi (the majority) 
systems i.e. the Hutus were the majority.  
The revolution ended with an interim government, which was led by a former 
seminarian...After the elections the first Hutu president was Grégoire Kayibanda who 
was a personal secretary of the Roman Catholic  Archbishop  Andre Perraudin and editor 
of a Catholic newspaper (Kumalo 2007:219).   
This elimination of Tutsi leadership was eventually to end with the massive killing of both 
the Tutsi population and moderate Hutus, as there had been much hatred and opposition from 
the Hutu against the Tutsis monopolistic leadership. In 1959 and 1973 respectively, there 
were continual threats against the Batutsi. McCullum (1995:6-7) reports that close to 15,000 
Tutsis were killed in the late 1950s and 20,000 in 1963; and there was also another wave of 
ethnic  violence in 1973 in which Habyarimana took power by force to enhance Hutu power. 
Some members of the Tutsi group were expelled from schools, and as a result, a large number 
of Batutsi went into exile in the neighbouring countries, especially Uganda (Kirschke 
1996:12).  
                                                          





1.2.2.3 The 1994 Genocide 
The genocide which was intended to wipe out all Tutsi individuals in the country began in 
April 1994; it started right after the aeroplane carrying president Habyarimana of Rwanda 
and President Ntaryamira of Burundi was shot down. It is not known who shot down the 
aircraft, but some argue that the speed at which the Government armed forces began the 
bloodshed, could suggest that both the crash and the bloodshed were planned by them 
(Kirschke, 1996:18). However, others like the French and the Belgians have accused the 
current leadership of Rwanda of planning the shooting down of the airplane. This incident set 
off the Rwandan genocide, killing more than 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus, in only one 
hundred days.  
According to Caplan Gerald (2010:1) President Habyarimana was returning from a meeting 
of regional heads of states in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, during which he had agreed to sign a 
peace accord with the RPF, which was then a group of Rwandan rebels who were living in 
exile in Uganda, seeking to return. It is argued, therefore, that the Hutu extremists chose to 
shoot down their own leader to avoid the peace accord and to carry out the long awaited 
bloodshed of the Tutsis (Caplan 2010:1). 
The genocide was horrific in a way that about 5000 pregnancies as a result of rape were 
recorded and the United Nations reported that between 250,000 to 500,000 women were 
raped (Guillebaud 2005:120). Kirschke (1997:18) indicates that a French historian, Gerard 
Prunier, estimated that 80% of the victims were killed during the first six weeks of the 
genocide, an extermination rate which would prove five times as fast as that of the Nazi death 
camps. People were brutally murdered while the rest of the world looked on. Even the UN 
peacekeeping soldiers were mandated to withdraw while the massacre was taking place. At 
the same time, the Churches that should have opposed or acted against this evil were in fact 
complicit.  
1.2.2.4 Complicity of the Churches 
It is important to note that although there was widespread complicity of Christians in the 
genocide, there were also some who refused to participate, and even risked their own lives to 
save others. What legitimized the complicity of the Churches in the genocide was the close 





Gatwa (1999:349) observes that post-genocide literature both locally and internationally is 
packed with references to the Churches. Seminars and conferences have been held under the 
theme “the Churches and the Genocide”, not to compliment the Churches, but to question 
their position and role.  
As mentioned above, complicity of the Churches in the Rwandan Genocide was visible, 
especially the RCC, which had strong ties with the State throughout Rwandan history. 
However, having the RCC as the State Church in Rwandan political history does not rule out 
the role of the Protestant Churches in the genocide. The difference is that Protestant 
missionaries who began their work in Rwanda slightly later, tended to take a “non-political” 
stance. However, they also did not oppose social injustices that were based on ethnicity.  
Catholic evangelism was more focussed on mass conversion and increased political 
influence. Protestant missionaries, especially from England, attempted to be devotionally- 
minded but they did not concern themselves with social action and discipleship. 
In the 1991 census 90% of Rwandans called themselves Christians. 62% Roman 
Catholics, 18% protestant, 8% Seventh Day Adventists; the rest were Moslem or had 
traditional African religion.  However, as the Roman Catholic priest said, ‘we baptized 
many people but we did not disciple them as Christians...’;  there were only about 8% 
Rwandans who were true Bible–believing, spirit filled Christians in the country- and they 
did not get involved in the killings... they were willing to risk all to save others, and 
several of them were themselves killed...Before the genocide up to 90% of the people 
were merely nominal Christians due to the failure of the Churches to do the work of 
discipling these multitudes (Guillebaud 2002:284-285). 
There were, however, some voices from the Churches condemning the genocide 
although numerous Church leaders went against this and took part in the crime through 
betrayal of their fellow Church members. McCollum (1995:68) notes the demand of 
Pope John Paul II to end the bloodshed of the genocide some weeks after April 1994. 
Some RCC leaders together with the association of the Protestant Churches produced a 
peace-making document which blamed both the RPF and the Government, and called 
on them to seek an end to the massacre. It also called on Christians to refuse to 





1.3 Short Description of the Research Project 
This study assesses the state of democracy in post-genocide Rwanda, using the consensual 
democracy of Kwasi Wiredu theoretical frame work. The study also concerns the 
reconstruction of the Churches in the same time frame using the theology of reconstruction of 
Jesse Mugambi.    
1.4 Background, Motivation of the Study and Identification of the Research Problem  
 
Throughout the history of Rwanda, people-driven development through a working and 
suitable democracy has not had a chance to be introduced and established due to social 
tension and violence based on ethnicity2.  
 
There has been, however, some degree of transformation and remarkable levels of 
development in Rwanda after the genocide. The current government has been greatly admired 
for what has been achieved after the genocide that left the country in economic ruin 
(Sidiropoulos 2002). Post-genocide government also, unlike in the past, has abolished 
identification of Rwandan citizens on the basis of ethnicity. As reflected in the new national 
constitution, the focus has shifted to building national unity, and consensual way of decision-
making has been established amongst political parties (Rwandan Government 2003).  
 
On the other hand, the current government has also been criticised, that the current president, 
Paul Kagame (who is a Tutsi and who returned from exile in Uganda as RPF’s army 
commander), has put a limit to involvement in national governance; political power in the 
post-genocide Rwanda, being in the hands of the new Tutsi clan who returned mainly from 
Uganda Reyntjens Filip (2005) and Daley Patricia (2009].  More importantly, there are 
Rwandans in different parts of the world who are in a politically organised opposition against 
the current government (Sidiropoulos 2002). These factionalism, divisions and disputes 
within the Rwandan community, could be a challenge to holistic and sustainable development 
through a working and contextually suitable democracy. 
 
It is, therefore, in the interest of the researcher to evaluate the state of democracy in Rwanda 
after the genocide, using a proposed theoretical framework. As noted in the background of 
the context, the RCC had been the largest and the most influential. It is also noted in the 
                                                          
2 Rwandan population consisted 83% Hutu, 16% Tutsi and (1%) Twa. Only the Hutus and the Tutsis have been 
at the centre of ethnic based conflict. After the genocide, identification of individuals by their ethnicity has been 





background that the RCC has had generally a negative image due to its complicity in 
Rwandan history of ethnic divide and genocide. It is, therefore, also in the interest of the 
researcher to evaluate the role of the RCC in post-genocide Rwandan society, and if there has 
been any internal reconstruction of the Church, using a proposed theoretical frame.      
 
1.5 The Research Question 
 
With the concern for a democracy that enhances sustainable development in post- genocide 
Rwanda, and with an interest in how the Churches can play a prophetic role, the research 
question is formulated as follows: 
To what extent is post-genocide Rwandan democracy consensus based, and to what extent 
has post-genocide Churches been reconstructed (focusing on the RCC)?     
 
1.6 Preliminary Literature Review 
1.6.1 Defining democracy  
Munamato (2010:183) points out that the term “democracy” has been popularised by 
Abraham Lincoln, in his address in Gettysburg, where he defined it as a “government of the 
people, by the people and for the people”. Similarly for Nürnberger Klaus (1991:9), 
“democracy means that the people themselves are ultimately responsible for the decisions 
concerning their collective life”. Nürnberger (1991:10) distinguishes between two forms of 
democracy namely: participatory and representative democracy. With participatory 
democracy, citizens participate directly in decision-making in social issues that affect them. 
With representative democracy, citizens freely elect their leaders who represent them in 
decision-making (Nürnberger 1991:10). Democracy has many other variants; one that is used 
in this study is that of consensual democracy. 
1.6.2 Theoretical Frameworks  
The theoretical frameworks used in this study are those of consensual democracy and the 







1.6.2. a. Consensual Democracy  
According to Clarke B. A. Paula and Forweraker Joe (2001:1), consensual democracy is 
based on consensus of all in decision-making. It concerns not just the majority but more than 
the majority. Consensual democracy is a debate in African philosophy and this study explores 
the work of African philosopher Kwasi Wiredu who explored African consensual democracy, 
drawing on examples of his culture of the Akans in Ghana.  
The Ashantis had non-party governance that allowed every adult member of the society to 
participate through active representation (Wiredu 1997 and 2000). According to Wiredu 
(1997:303), consensual democracy is a deliberate form of avoiding conflicts. Wiredu (1997) 
argues that consensual democracy requires willingness to consensus, and that dialogue can 
then work for a willing suspension of disagreement. Consensual democracy, although not 
perfect, is better than one-party or multi-party polities that do not allow a representation of all 
in decision-making (Wiredu 1997). Wiredu’s theory of consensual democracy has been 
criticised by Eze C. Emmanuel (1997 and 2000) and Matolino Bernard (2009 and 2013) 
generally about its applicability in a capitalistic modernised, post-colonial Africa. Eze and 
Matolino’s criticisms however, do not succeed to discredit Wiredu’s theory.         
1.6.2. b. The Theology of Reconstruction  
The Theology of reconstruction was introduced by Jesse Mugambi at the All African 
Conference of Churches (AACC) in 1990  in Nairobi, Kenya (Gathogo  2006:3). The 
theology emphasises African responsibility to move towards reconstruction after the end of 
colonialism, cold war and apartheid. The theology thus shifts from liberation to a theological 
theme of reconstruction (Mugambi 1991). Mugambi’s address at the AACC was published a 
year later, in 1991. In 1995, he published a book titled: From Liberation to Reconstruction: 
African Christian Theology after the Cold War which was a refined collection of his 
delivered lectures at Rice University where he taught while on Sabbatical leave from the 
University of Nairobi (1990-91) (Mugambi 1995: vii). It is in this publication that he 
articulates in detail about reconstruction theology; the need to move from liberation theology 
to a reconstruction theology in Africa, and what reconstruction theology entail. 
 In 1997, another book titled: The Churches and Reconstruction of Africa was published and 
edited by Mugambi, which contains  his contribution titled: Social Reconstruction of Africa: 





be the basis for African nations to reconstruct social structures of economy, politics, ethics, 
aesthetics and ontology (Mugambi 1997:4).  
Mugambi’s theology of reconstruction attracted numerous responses. His earliest critique was 
from Maluleke Tinyiko (1997) for not considering the effects of neo-colonialism of Africa, 
and for diminishing previous African theologies. Mugambi’s Biblical reference has been 
criticised by Farisani Elelweni (2002) for not developing a critical analysis of Biblical texts 
that he based his theology on. In 2003, Mugambi responded to the criticisms of his 
theological paradigm of reconstruction in a publication titled Christian theology and social 
reconstruction.  In this book, he clarifies that both liberation and reconstruction are social 
movements with different aims. Liberation involves war while reconstruction involves 
rebuilding. Liberation precedes reconstruction (Mugambi 2003: 62).    
1.6.3 The Democracy state in post-Genocide Rwanda     
 
Democracy in post-genocide Rwanda still poses challenges due to ethnic ideology and 
divisions among political powers. There is a general comment that after the genocide, 
Rwanda has witnessed an improved growth in many social services such as health and 
poverty alleviation (Sambo 2012). However, an issue of great concern is that some citizens 
living outside the country have formed an opposition against the current Government 
(Garrison 2013). Rwanda is also being overly criticised by the international community as 
lacking real democracy. Social scholars such as Reyntjens (2005), Longman (2006) and 
Daley (2009) have critiqued Rwandan democracy, pointing out that the country lacks the 
essence of true democracy. 
 
The Churches that had a collaborative relationship with the government throughout the pre-
genocide period, especially the RCC, which was regarded as the State Church, has changed 
its stance in post-genocide Rwanda (Oyweghrn 1996). It is argued that the fall of the pre-
genocide government marked the fall of the clerical state [Catholic Church]. The RCC on the 
other hand has been active in the social reconstruction of the country after the genocide (Fast 






1.7 Sub-Questions that this Study Intends to Answer 
i. What is the state of democracy in post-genocide Rwanda in the light of consensual 
democracy of Kwasi Wiredu?  
 
ii. How have RCC been reconstructed for their prophetic responsibility after the 
genocide, using the theology of reconstruction of Jesse Mugambi? 
1.8 The Main Objectives of the Study are: 
 
i. To assess the state of democracy in post-genocide Rwanda in the light of consensus 
democracy of Kwasi Wiredu 
  
ii. To assess the reconstruction of the RCC and its prophetic responsibility after the 
genocide.  
 
1.9 Research Methodology 
This study is based on qualitative and non-empirical research. Data was obtained from 
available published literature on the subject by reviewing books, articles, and on-line 
resources. Chapter three includes social media and political interaction networks as it is here 
where relevant information was mostly found. Published materials have been obtained 
primarily from the libraries of the University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN), as well as the 
libraries of its cluster institutions. These include the Evangelical Seminary of Southern Africa 
(ESSA); the Lutheran Theological Institute (LTI), and St Joseph’s Theological Institute 
(SJTI).  
1.10 Structure of the Research Project 
 
Chapter One: This chapter provides the scope of the contextual background and introduction 
to the study  
 
Chapter Two: The second chapter reviews the theoretical frameworks pertaining to this 
study which are the consensual democracy according to Kwasi Wiredu, and the theology of 





Chapter Three: This chapter assesses the state of democracy in post-genocide Rwanda 
viewed through the lens of consensual democracy framework.  
 
Chapter Four: This chapter provides introductory comments on the situation of Churches in 
Rwanda after the genocide and focuses on assessing the role of the RCC after the genocide, 
regarding its prophetic responsibility using the theology of reconstruction framework.  
 
Chapter Five: The final chapter offers a conclusion to the study. 
1.11 Conclusion  
This chapter has given the background of the context in which the study is done. It is shown 
in the historical account of pre-genocide Rwanda in the literature reviewed, that throughout 
the history, democracy had strong loopholes due to ethnic tensions between Hutus and Tutsis; 
which climaxed in 1994 genocide. This ethnic based tension and violence were mainly 
supported and influenced by the State power. It is also shown that the RCC being the largest 
with more than 60% of the population belonging to the Church3, had a notable influence in 
the political life of pre-genocide Rwanda, with its leaders working hand in hand with the pre-
genocide State. This chapter has also given a description of the study by highlighting the 






                                                          






CONSENSUAL DEMOCRACY AND THEOLOGY OF 
RECONSTRUCTION THEORIES 
2.1 Introduction  
From the historical account of pre-genocide Rwanda, Post-genocide Rwanda has been 
different in terms of political strategic leadership. Rwandans are no longer identified 
according to their ethnicity. The post-genocide government has indicated its commitment to 
build national unity, reconciliation and wider political participation. In order to avoid 
conflicts and the negatively influencing political parties of the past on the basis of ethnic 
ideology, the post-genocide government has established a consensual democracy by creating 
a forum in which political parties operate on the basis of commonly agreed principles by the 
parties involved. With these changes in the political arena in post-genocide Rwanda, and 
having identified the consensual democracy theory of Kwasi Wiredu as having an in-depth 
understanding and convincing argument of the need for consensual democracy as far as 
sustainable development is concerned, the theory has been chosen as a lens through which to 
assess the post-genocide state of democracy.  
This chapter will discourse on the consensual democracy theory of Kwasi Wiredu before 
using it as a guideline in chapter three, in assessing the state of democracy in post-genocide 
Rwanda. The Churches, which are expected to be moral agents of the society, have a negative 
and tainted image in post-genocide Rwanda, for having played a negative role in the past and 
their complicity in the genocide. Post-genocide Churches have presumed the role of helping 
the post-genocide Rwandan society to heal and to reconcile.  Perceiving post-genocide time 
as a reconstruction time for the Churches however, the theology of reconstruction of Jesse 
Mugambi challenges the Church to review its theological approaches so that they will be in 
tandem with the immediate needs of post-genocide democracy.  
This chapter thus also reviews the theology of reconstruction before it is used as a guideline 
in chapter four, which uses this guideline to assess the implications of post-genocide 





2.2 Consensual Democracy         
2.2.1 Defining the Term Democracy  
Before discoursing on consensual democracy, it is important to define democracy as the term.   
Becker Paula and Raveloson Jean-Aimé (2008:4) provide a general definition of democracy 
as follows: 
 
The word “democracy” is a term that comes from Greek and it is made up of two other 
words demos (lit: people) and kratein (lit: to govern, to rule). “Democracy” can then be 
literally translated by the following terms: Government of the People or Government of 
the Majority. Democracy, as a State form, is to be distinguished from monarchy, 
aristocracy and dictatorship. 
 
In the same way, Nürnberger (1991:9) defines democracy as the government of the people, 
while referring to Abraham Lincoln. Nürnberger (1991:9) goes on to say that reference to 
“the people” implies involvement of all people, and not simply a selected few. What 
distinguishes an authoritarian rule from a democratic rule is that with the former, authority is 
located at the top of the social pyramid, where the rulers impose their authority on their 
subjects (Nürnberger 1991:10). For him, “Freedom is a tender plant which must be protected 
to survive and to thrive. Therefore, to protect and enhance freedom you need power, but the 
use of this power must be controlled, otherwise it destroys freedom” (Nürnberger 1991:10).  
 
The central concern of democracy in general is the distribution of power, where citizens are 
actively involved in the social, economic and political affairs of their country, and the elected 
political leaders have to collaborate with the citizens. Kazeem (2010:2) similarly asserts that 
it is impossible to give a clear-cut definition of democracy with its many types. He asserts 
however, that all types of democracy share the same central elements, which are: “free and 
fair elections, open, an accountable and responsible government, civil and political and 





2.2.2 The Theory of Consensual Democracy 
 
Also referred to as consensus democracy, consensual democracy in “Western” democratic 
terms is defined as the polar opposite of majoritarianism (Clarke et al 2001). This means that 
a majoritarian democracy concerns the majority, while consensual democracy concerns more 
than the majority, that is, as many as possible. Consensual democracy is strongly related to a 
better representation of women in a nation’s parliament and its cabinet, thereby balancing 
social income and encouraging more involvement in voting (Clarke et al 2001). Consensual 
democracy has also been explored in African philosophy by Kwasi Wiredu who argues that 
consensual democracy has African origins (Wiredu 1997:182). He elaborates on it through a 
case study of governance of a Ghanaian sub-tribe of Ashanti from the Akans.  
2.2.3 African Consensual Democracy   
2.2.3.1  Decision-making by consensus 
 
Wiredu is a Ghanaian African philosopher who has focused at length on traditional 
philosophy, and who has shown interest by writing on conceptual decolonization. Wiredu 
was born in 1931 in Ghana, where he had an early exposure to philosophy (Osha   2005: vii). 
Logic as a branch of philosophy and practical psychology were more attractive to Wiredu. He 
was greatly impressed by the dialectical text The last days of Socrates which to a large extent 
influenced the final  chapter of his first philosophical work that is dialogic, titled Philosophy 
and an African culture (1980) (Osha 2005: ix). Wiredu was mainly instructed in Western 
philosophy in his philosophical education in Ghana, and discovered African philosophy 
through his own individual efforts (Osha 2005: ix). 
In 1958, he attended an analytic school of philosophy at Oxford. The submission of his thesis 
was titled Knowledge, Truth and Reason. For Wiredu, African philosophy is grounded in the 
task of what he terms conceptual decolonization. In an interview cited by Oladipos Olusegun 
(2002:337), Wiredu explains conceptual decolonization to mean: 
…the purging of African philosophical thinking of all uncritical assimilation of Western 
ways of thinking. That, of course, would be only part of the battle won. The other 
desiderata are the careful study of our own traditional philosophies and the synthesizing 





from the intellectual sources of the modern world. In my opinion, it is only by such a 
reflective integration of the traditional and the modern that contemporary African 
philosophers can contribute to the flourishing of our peoples and, ultimately, all other 
people. 
 
It is with this theme, interest and focus that Wiredu has written extensively on African 
culture, and largely on his Akan culture. Concerned with African decolonization, Wiredu 
revisited traditional African political systems that operated by consensus.    
According to Wiredu (1997:182), traditional African politics operated on consensus, and it 
was not a hyperbolical exercise when the former Zambian President, Kenneth Kaunda, stated 
that “in our original societies we operate by consensus”, and the statement by former 
President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, that “in African society the traditional method of 
conducting affairs is by free discussion... The elders sit under the big tree and talk until they 
agree” (Wiredu 2000:2). 
Wiredu argues that consensual democracy is intrinsic to reconciliation as the intention is to 
ensure that all political parties are satisfactorily represented. Although it is not about total 
agreement, Wiredu (1997:183) contends that: 
 
…to begin with consensus usually presupposes an original position of diversity 
...where there is the will to consensus, dialogue can lead to a willing suspension of 
disagreement, making possible agreed actions without necessarily agreed notions. 
 
According to Wiredu (1997:303), the importance and reliance on consensus is a 
manifestation of an imminent approach to social interaction and not a uniquely political 
phenomenon. Generally, in interpersonal relations among adults, consensus as a basis of joint 
action was taken as axiomatic. Consensus ensures that all parties are satisfied with their 
involvement in decision-making regarding the future. “Dialogue can work...for smoothing 
edges to produce compromises that are agreeable to all or at least not obnoxious to any” 
(Wiredu 1997:304). 
Wiredu asserts that the African political systems in the past were twofold. There was a 
centralised authority curried out through a central government such as the Zulu and the 
Ngwato of South Africa, and the Banyankole of Uganda. There were also those without any 





(Wiredu 2000:3). Wiredu thus argues that it should be a matter of substantial interest to 
political thinkers that societies without centralised authority were not less organised than 
those with central authority as a form of government. Moreover, Wiredu (2000:3) argues 
further that it is easier for societies with less centralised authority to appreciate the necessity 
of consensus. Wiredu elaborates on his argument of the functioning of consensual democracy 
through an example of traditional government of one of Ghanaian sub- groups of the Akan 
group, the Ashantis. 
2.2.3.2 The Political Organisation of the Ashantis  
The basic political unit of the Ashantis is a lineage. These are groups or units, and each unit 
consists of all the inhabitants of a town or village. The unit has a head who becomes a 
member of the council. The council is the governing body of the village or town (Wiredu 
1997:184). The qualifications for the lineage headship are:   
Seniority in age, wisdom, a sense of civic responsibility and logical persuasiveness.  All 
these qualities are often united in the most senior, but non-senile member of the lineage. 
In that case, election is almost routine. But where these qualities do not seem to converge 
in one person, elections may entail prolonged and painstaking consultations and 
discussions aimed at consensus (1997:184).  
It is to be noted that the word “election” in the above quotation does not refer to formal, 
modern voting. Wiredu states that there is no formal voting amongst  the Ashanti people; in 
fact, there is no specific word in the Ashanti language for voting, and the word used for 
voting (aba to) is “a modern coinage for modern cultural import” (Wiredu 1997:184). The 
electing of the head of the lineage is the first stage where consensus is felt in the Ashanti 
political process. Once the head is elected on the basis of consensus, the position is for life 
except in cases of moral, intellectual and physical degeneration.  
A head of a lineage, as the representative of a particular lineage in the governing council of a 
village or a town had the  responsibility to hold consultations with the adult members of the 
lineage, regarding municipal matters (Wiredu 2000:3). Consensus was the driving principle 
regarding significant matters in a lineage. The council was the next governing level, and 
consensus was also the driving principle at council level. The councils consisted of lineage 





lineage of a substantial kinship group4 (Wiredu 2000:4). Wiredu (2000:4) goes on to refer to 
Abraham’s documentation of the Akans, pointing out that the office of a chief was sacred, 
because a chief was the link between the living populace and their dead ancestors. The chief 
was a symbol of the unity of the kingdom. The chief did not, however, contribute to 
governance with any supposed divine inspiration, but with the persuasiveness of personal 
ideas (Wiredu 2000:4). The word of the Chief was not law but the consensus of the council. 
This is the reason why the Akans have a saying that there are no bad kings, only bad 
councillors (Wiredu 2000:4). 
The Councils were the basic political boundaries and were highly representative in 
composition and decision-making. Representatives that headed the councils, the chiefs, 
formed the upper divisional councils headed by “paramount” chiefs. These upper councils 
also sent their representatives to the national council presided over by Asantehene, the king of 
the Ashantis. This was the highest level of traditional government of the Ashantis, and 
consensus was the basis for decision-making at all government levels (Wiredu 2000:5).  
 
The Ashantis believed that all members of the society shared the same interests although the 
immediate perceptions may differ. It is for this reason that decision-making by consensus was 
a premeditated option. This was expressed through an Ashanti art-work of a crocodile with 
one stomach and two heads in the struggle for food. If the two heads could see that the food is 
for the same stomach, the irrationality of the conflict will become evident (Wiredu 
1997:185).  
                                                          
4 As far as the researcher is aware, Wiredu does not elaborate in detail on how a chief and all the upper 
representatives were chosen. The assumption however would be that this was done also out of consensus of all 







(Source: Wiredu 2000:5) 
 
Ashanti people believe that through rational discussion, human beings are able to eventually 
see through their differences to the realisation that their interests are the same; as their 
common saying states: “There is no problem in human relations that cannot be resolved by 
dialogue.” Dialogue does not only involve at least two parties, but also two conflicting 
positions (Wiredu 2000:5). Wiredu (2000:5) quotes more Ashanti expressions that 
demonstrate their embedded values of consensus, such as “one head does not hold council” or 
that “two heads are better than one.” Wiredu (2000:5) emphasises that Ashanti consensual 
democracy was based on rationality, in such a way that the ability for elegant and persuasive 
discourse was deemed one of the most crucial qualifications for high office.        
 
2.2.3.3 Non-party and multi-party democracies and representation  
 
Wiredu (1997:186) notes that “the pursuit of consensus was a deliberate effort to go beyond 
decisions by majority opinion. It is easier to secure majority agreement than to achieve 
consensus.” Wiredu (1997:186) maintains that a lack of proper and practical representation is 
the root of adversarial politics; and consensus is the antidote to this. Moreover, majority 






On the Ashanti view, substantive representation is a matter of a fundamental human 
right. Each human being has the right to be represented not only in council, but also in 
council in any matter relevant to his or her interests or those of their groups. This is why 
consensus is so important (Wiredu 2000:6).  
 
The point to be noted is that consensus is there as a principle for decision making. Wiredu 
(1997:187) argues further that any system of politics that is seriously dedicated to the aim of 
consensus is institutionally from a system that is based on the majority vote. Wiredu argues 
that the Ashantis had a consensual democracy because decision-making was done on the 
basis of consensus through representatives. On the contrary, the current majoritarian 
democracies are led by a political party that wins the majority votes and the most seats 
(Wiredu 2000:6). These political parties are organisations of people of similar aspirations 
with an aim of obtaining power to implement their aspirations.       
 
Wiredu explains that parties had a different meaning and significance in the Ashanti system 
of consensual democracy. In other words, it was not a party system. Parties referred to the 
levels of social governance that allowed communication and representation and none of the 
groups organised themselves with the intention of gaining power in order to exclude others 
from the same power. “For all concerned, the system was set up for participation in power, 
not its appropriation, and the underlying philosophy was one of cooperation, not 
confrontation” (Wiredu 1997:187). 
Advocates of a one-party system in African traditional governance understood the reality of 
the destructive nature of competition amongst political parties, and that there is no direct 
connection of multi-party system and democracy. Wiredu (2000:7) however points out that 
the problem with the one-party system was that it was one party because the murdered parties 
could not compete. Indigenous African systems of governance worked well without the 
mechanism of a multi-party system through parties of administrative territories and 
representation which allowed meaningful dialogue. According to Wiredu, a one party system 
was a hindrance to this mechanism of inclusive consensus. “...those conditions of rational 
interaction that one-party system was so efficient in destroying” (2000:7).  
 
Wiredu (2001:227-228) defines multi-party democracies as “a political system in which 
executive and legislative powers are assumed and exercised only by groups, not necessarily 





independent judiciary and free press.” Furthermore, as observed by Wiredu (2001:229), large 
sums of funds are used by political parties to manipulate the voters. The winning party should 
win majority votes in majoritarian and multi-party democracies, which presents a challenge 
to the representation of the minority.  
Wiredu (2001:230) thus asks whether there is a difference between the rule of the majority 
and the tyranny of the majority. The unhappiness of the minority as a result of the dominance 
of the majority is usually expressed through the formation of opposition parties; and even in 
this case, representation can hardly work through weak and defeated parties. In fact, 
questions have been posed to the advocates of the multi-party democracies whether there is 
no better practicality of governance and the answer has been that despite all its obvious faults, 
no better system is practicable.  
The above view which Wiredu (2001:233) refutes by asserting that consensual democracy is 
a better option seen, not only in traditional African governance but also in some European 
countries such as Switzerland and Belgium. This indicates firstly, that there is a realised 
faultiness of multi-party democracies in the industrialised states. Secondly, in practical terms, 
this counteracts the idea that consensual democracy can only work in simple, pre-
industrialised states such as those of pre-colonial Africa (Wiredu 2001:233).     
Wiredu points out that, multi-party democracies are a fixation of Anglo-American models 
which, once liberated from this hold, it becomes possible to explore the possibilities of a 
more workable polity (2001:233).   
To further show a difference between the meaning and functioning of parties in multi-party 
and consensual democracy, Wiredu (2001) discusses parties in numerical order - Party1, refers  
to individuals or groups of individuals with an interest or concern in a given issue or project. 
Party2, refers to simply being a participant in decision making; and Party3 refers to the well-
known political sense in multi-party democracies where parties are to compete (Wiredu 
2001:238). Wiredu draws this numerical explanation of parties from his the statement that:  
All the parties to any group deliberation that produces consensus are 
party to the decision reached. This contrasts sharply with 





group or group of groups as opposed to another. In politics this 
usually means the majority party (Wiredu 2001:238).5  
 
Wiredu (1997:188) reflecting on his statement quoted above, which he draws from, in his 
numerically three sets of parties, states that party1, and party2 are incorporated in consensual 
democracy. However, in a consensual democracy, all parties have to come to an agreement 
through dialogue, unlike with competitive party3. In other words, all parties1 in consensual 
democracy have to become party2.     
Advocating for a non-party system, Wiredu asserts that there is no necessary connection 
between democracy and the multi-party system. Wiredu (1997:188), however, rightly point 
out that the traditional parameters within which consensual democracy existed are different 
from those in modern African nations. He further states that traditional Africa has 
nevertheless been characterised by frequent ethnic wars and conflicts. Consequently, he 
asserts that neither consensual democracy nor the current multi-party system promise peace 
in ethnically divided African societies. Building on his earlier comments, however, he 
concludes that consensual democracy is more promising for Africa than the multi-party 
system (Wiredu 1997:189). Wiredu (2000:7) states that Africa has been under pressure from 
the West to implant multi-party democracies and this has been politically fatal for Africa, 
although some found ways to survive this system.  
Wiredu (2000:7) thus observes that it has not attracted enough attention; that multi-party 
democracies have not shown strength for indigenous African institutions. He holds that 
traditional political life was less complicated than the present multi-party system (Wiredu 
2000:8). Furthermore, a multi-party system tends to exclude the minority in ethnically diverse 
Africa (Wiredu 2000:8), and it has managed to do so in modern Africa, where many ethnic 
groups have been excluded from political ownership in their own contexts.  
“The ethnic stratification of nearly all contemporary African states has ensured that many 
ethnic groups will be politically marginalized, a condition that breeds grievances unpropitious 
to stability or economic development or anything good for humans” (Wiredu 2001:233).     
      
2.2.4 Summary of Wiredu’s Theory of Consensual Democracy  
 Consensual democracy derives from a realisation of the need of consensus 
                                                          





 Consensual democracy is about possible agreed actions without necessarily agreed 
notions  
 Consensual democracyis concerned for all, rather than simply the majority  
 Dialogue can work to produce compromises that are agreeable to all, or at least not 
obnoxious to any 
 African political systems in the past were twofold, that is, centralised authority and 
decentralised authority.  
  The basic political unit of the Ashantis was the lineage, which was used as a base to 
demonstrate the administration of consensual democracy. This lineage was the most 
important political unit, consisting all inhabitants of a town or village 
 Given that there was no voting in the Ashanti politics, the  qualifications of the heads 
of lineages were Seniority in age, wisdom, a sense of civic responsibility and logical 
persuasiveness 
 The heads of lineages formed a body called the council, in which every lineage head 
had a duty to represent their lineage  
 The councils were headed by chiefs, of which the chieftaincy position was hereditary 
from a substantial lineage, and symbolized national unity 
 The chiefs were further headed by paramount chiefs, who were headed by Asantehene 
– the king of Ashantis  
 All parties in this system of governances were represented, and rationality remained 
the driving point  
 The Ashantis believed that humanity shared the same interests  
 Ashanti consensual democracy was a non-party democracy. So instead of parties, they 
referred to the political levels that allowed communication and representation   
 A lack of practical representation constitutes the root of adversarial politics 
 It is a human right to be represented in matters of their interests   
 Non-party consensual democracy is  to be distinguished from one-party polity which 
like multiparty democracies today does not necessarily allow practical 
representation, given that power remains centred around the top leaders in the party  
 Lack of practical representation or misrepresentation is hindrance to sustainable 





2.2.5 Responses to Wiredu’s Consensual Democracy  
Eze (2000:2) is concerned about Wiredu’s claim that consensual democracy is African, 
traditional and pre-colonial, and adversary majoritarian democracies are of Western import, 
modern and post-colonial; while there are post-colonial African dictators who have abused 
and manipulated the traditional ideals of consensual politics. Eze however does not bear in 
mind here that Wiredu (1997:189) was aware of the African traditional politics having been 
manipulated. Wiredu (1997:189) moreover, does not claim that consensual democracy is or 
was perfect. He is rather of the view that it is better than majoritarian democracies and he 
argues this point satisfactorily. 
 
Eze (2000:4) goes on to argue that Wiredu in his theory of consensual democracy, drawing 
on the Ashanti traditional government, fails to clearly demonstrate where the power lies; 
either with the king, chiefs or the subjects. With this argument, however, Eze again fails to 
understand Wiredu’s theory. Wiredu (1997:187) clearly puts it across that the Ashantis 
understood the unavoidable need for sharing power. He states that none of the government 
groups was organised with the intention of gaining power in order to exclude others. The 
system was set up for participation in power, not its appropriation (Wiredu 1997:187). 
Furthermore, a chief was a symbol of unity of the kingdom (Wiredu 2000:4). 
Eze (2000:4) furthermore observes that Wiredu needed more evidence that the chiefs and the 
king ruled and reasoned along with the people on the basis of reason rather than divine 
influence. Wiredu (2000:4), however, does clearly explain that the king did not contribute to 
governance from divine influence but from his own reasoning. Although Wiredu (2000:4) 
stated that the king was the link between the living population with their dead ancestors; he 
satisfactorily argues for the prudence of the option of consensual democracy and the use of 
reason rather than anything else. Eze (2000:4) himself later in his article agrees with this by 
pointing out that Wiredu also illustrates the Ashanti’s belief in rationality. 
Eze (2000:4), however, goes on to criticise Wiredu in that he does not show a connection 
between belief in rationality and in ancestors which would be more practical even in modern 
Africa. Eze (1997:318) is of the view that simple rationality would not make sense to the vast 
majority of Africans without making reference to the supernatural, superstitions, religion and 
so on. Eze’s (2000:4) concern, in other words, is that there is a connection between operating 





consensual democracy of the Ashantis is that their religious beliefs also served to bind them 
together and influenced their reasoning. For Eze, any democracy has to relate to any kind of 
mythology or utopia for it to endure.  
If the traditional mythological origins and justifications origins of consensual politics can 
no longer hold today (due to secularisation and religious pluralisms, for example), and it 
is determined that what we need today is a form of consensual politics, then we may have 
to (re)invent usable-even as we discard unusable-mythologies. For, even-and especially a 
secular political institution, if it renounces brute force as a mode of mobilisation, needs 
some sort mythology- Plato’s “truthful lies,” or various forms of utopia-in order to 
endure (Eze 1997:318). 
Reflecting on Eze’s argument above, it does not seem correct that reason needs forms of 
mythology. In fact, as he points out, Africa has become diverse in  matters of faith; and   thus 
rationality is perhaps  the one ideal tool that modern Africa could bring to the table in the 
common discussion about matters that affect us all,  such as  a social government. 
Furthermore, Eze (1997:320) does not agree with Wiredu that people’s interests are 
ultimately the same, as Wiredu (2000:5) argues. Eze (2000:6) reinterprets Wiredu’s (2000:6) 
reference to the Ashantis artwork of a crocodile with two heads, by asserting that Wiredu 
wrongly states that the conflict between the crocodile’s heads over food destined for the same 
stomach, is irrational.  
Eze (2000:6) argues that the conflict between the two heads would be rational because the 
more food that passes through one head’s mouth and not the other, the better for the head 
whose mouth more food passes through. One could disagree with Eze (2000:6), by agreeing 
with Wiredu (1997:186)’s factual notion that a lack of proper and practical representation is 
the root of adversarial politics. It could be said that if each of the heads wanted more food to 
pass through their mouths without a consideration for each other, it will cause endless 
conflict between the two heads. The chances are firstly that the heads will be too busy 
fighting rather than taking care of the sources of food that passes through their mouths into 
their one stomach; and secondly, the fighting will negatively affect the source  of the food, 
and this will negatively affect both heads. The fact is that both heads need food to pass 
through their mouths. Perhaps, although Wiredu does not state this, the shared stomach and 
thus the he oneness of the crocodile symbolises same resources that are shared by the society 





Holding that people’s interests in a society are not the same, Eze (1997:320) contends that 
competition is natural. According to him, democracy is one of the social frameworks that 
serve to mediate the conflicting nature of individuals. According to Eze (1997:321), 
democracy is a social pact that says “we will agree or agree to disagree.” It provides 
mechanisms through which competing parties shall maintain in each of the possibilities. In 
other words, for Eze, democracy only provides parameters through which political parties 
compete for each to achieve their goals. However, contrary to Eze’s views,  
democracies’ shared aim is rather to promote, if not everyone’s, the majority’s interests.   
A point that Matolino’s (2009) later makes in his critical response to Eze’s critique of 
Wiredu. Matolino (2009) differs with Eze’s comprehension of Wiredu’s arguments. Matalino 
(2009:36) does not agree with Eze that Wiredu failed to identify the political power-holders 
in the Ashantis’ consensual democracy. Eze believes that political leaders had political power 
and influence, since Wiredu distinguished them. Matalino, on the other hand holds that 
Wiredu does show clearly that the king was chosen on the basis of his persuasive power and 
it was done through consensus. In other words, the king would have demonstrated good 
reasoning ability to be elected for this office rather than through his authority. Furthermore, 
Matolino (2009:36-37) does not agree with Eze that Wiredu needed to show more clearly the 
relationship between logical persuasiveness and religious beliefs.  
Matolino (2009:37) argues that Wiredu provides a valid explanation, that the political 
leadership of the Ashantis was based on rationality rather than on religious beliefs. According 
to him, Wiredu maintains that political leaders were chosen on the basis of their ability to 
reason and thus possessed a high degree of moral integrity which provided them with the 
credibility and worthiness to perform religious acts on behalf of others. The religious 
performances, however, had no direct relation to political duties as they do not influence the 
requirement of one’s ability to marshal logically persuasive arguments in political debates. 
“An individual’s moral worthiness and performance of religious rites, as a leader, does not as 
a matter of course diminish or enhance his prowess in constructing logical and persuasive 
arguments” (Matolino 2009:37). Matolino also perceives it differently from Eze that 
democracy goes hand in hand with mythology. He states that Eze by drawing extensively on 
mythology treats people as non- human and as not being able to reason. “It is just possible 
that a political system can be built on certain truths such as justice, civil liberty and equality 





Matolino (2009:42), however, claims to have offered a minor reformulation in his article of 
Wiredu’s perception that ultimately, people’s interests are the same, which Eze also entirely 
refutes. It is only on this point that Matolino (2009:42) tends to agree with Eze, but not after 
having reformulated Wiredu’s conception. Matolino, like Eze, does not agree with Wiredu 
that people’s interests are ultimately the same.  He states that  
I think Eze’s claim that competing and divergent interests are 
characteristic of human nature is correct. I also think that some 
interests pursued by some members of society could never be 
reconciled with the interests of the whole society e.g. domination. I 
also agree with him that Wiredu is mistaken in claiming that at the 
rock bottom there is an identity of interests and it is only 
misperception that hinders us from reaching that bottom (Matolino 
2009:40).  
Matolino, however, unlike Eze, does not believe that consensus is not possible because 
individuals have different interests. He points out that Eze misunderstands Wiredu’s 
argument that people with different interests can reach consensus through dialogue, which is 
at the heart of consensus. Dialogue is about building bridges between disparate opinions. He 
rightly argues that: 
I think consensus might just as well be informed by the realisation that a situation 
characterised by competing and divergent interests that do not take each other into 
consideration will not promote the pursuit of any interests at all (Matolino 2009:40).            
This statement is similar to that of Wiredu’s (1997:186) that a lack of inclusive representation 
is the root of adversarial politics. Matolino (2009:40) argues that it is self-evident that 
competing interests hinder and eventually destroy each other. In other words, competing 
views need to perceive the need for consensus for the common good. As Matolino (2009:40) 
states “In a never-ending series of conflicts and competitions no interest will triumph outright 
hence the urgency of dialogue with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable outcome will 
not be lost to the parties”.  
Matolino (2009:40-41) goes on to argue that although people’s interests are ultimately not the 
same, dialogue is necessary for a sustainable democracy. Dialogue, according to him, is 
realising that people with differing views are as serious the other. They all have to agree on 





…if this is our new understanding of how consensus works or of 
what informs consensus as opposed to Wiredu’s claim that at the 
rock bottom there is an identity of interests; then Eze’s objection 
loses its initial force. What we merely need to acknowledge is that 
serious differences do exist but there are mechanism of arriving at 
consensus that takes those differences seriously. In this way we 
change consensual democracy from a system that essentially searches 
for an identity of interests to one that seriously addresses a myriad of 
differences (Matolino 2009:41).  
However, Matolino would agree with Wiredu on this point, although Matolino does not 
realise. Wiredu (1997:183) in the initial stages of his argument of consensual democracy 
shows that he is aware that people do have different interests, by pointing out that consensus 
is about agreed actions and not agreed notions. What most likely Wiredu implied by shared 
human interests, is the shared humans needs for survival; and unless there is agreement on 
how to administer the shared resources and decisions that affect everyone, there is a problem, 
as there will not be any sustainability; to which both Wiredu and Matolino would agree.     
The last point of contention Matolino holds on Eze’s critique of Wiredu is his disagreement 
with Eze’s view of democracy. Matolino (2009:41), unlike Eze, does not believe that human 
differences are irreconcilable. His view is rather, that human beings as political entities can 
willingly co-operate. He asserts that Eze is erroneous in believing that democracy concerns 
itself with managing competing desires. For Matolino, democracy is about protection of 
rights, such as liberty and equality as fundamental aims. Matolino (2009:42) believes that 
there cannot be one aim of democracy, as there is not one type of democracy but many. 
However, what makes a democracy a democracy is that it is underpinned by values such as 
freedom and the protection of human rights (Matolino 2009:42).    
Matolino (2013), on the other hand however, wrote the critique of Wiredu after his critical 
response to Eze’s critique of Wiredu. Matalino (2013:138) responds to Wiredu’s article titled 
“Democracy by consensus: some conceptual considerations” (2001). Matolino (2013), with 
regards to his response to Eze, surprisingly disagrees with Wiredu’s views on the formulation 
of parties. Matolino (2013:142) reminds us that Wiredu’s consensual democracy is that of 
non-party polity, thus having titled his earlier essay, “Democracy by Consensus in African 
Traditional Politics: a plea for non-party polity” (1997). Furthermore, Wiredu, by “non-party 





first wave of newly independent African leaders such as Julius Nyerere, Kenneth Kaunda and 
others (Matolino 2013:142). Having shown clearly that consensual democracy is not a party 
democracy, Matolino argues, Wiredu goes on to talk about parties in numerical order, and 
contends that party1 is permissible under consensual democracy. 
With Wiredu’s numerical listing of parties, Matolino’s perception is that both party1 and 
party3 refer to actual political parties. He goes on to say therefore, that Wiredu’s ideas of 
parties do not cohere, as he appears to maintain different political parties1 while eliminating 
opposition parties3 (Matolino 2013:146). Matolino, however, does not grasp the difference 
between party1 and party3.  He misses the point that party1 could also be an individual or 
groups of individuals who are concerned about a particular issue or issues. Party1 therefore, 
within a party3 polity, may not necessarily have a voice, because firstly, a particular party1 
may not be the majority, and secondly, the ruling party3 may be the kind that does not tolerate 
other ideas other than their own, as it is with many current African governments; and 
according to Wiredu (1997:185) and Matolino (2009:41) this is the root of conflict and a 
hindrance to development.  
On the other hand, an option to consensual democracy is the realisation of this, and a 
deliberate attempt to avoid misrepresentation. In other words, all parties1 have to be party2 
within the consensus polity. Furthermore, Matolino does not perceive party2 as political 
parties, Matolino’s (2013:146) perception is that party2, is a decisional moment that all in 
party1 seek to attain, or seek to be involved in; or, as he goes on to put it differently, “party2 is 
effectively a moment of conversion, a desirable outcome of dialogue expressed in adopting a 
position that many parties1 agree with” (2013:146). This should not be viewed as a criticism, 
because Wiredu would agree with this. My understanding of Wiredu’s listing of parties is that 
he uses the listing as a way or a method to put his arguments across, to show the difference 
between one party polity or multi-party polity and consensual polity, and not that the three 
parties are to be referred to literally as political parties.     
After perceiving party1 and party2 as not living up to the conventional understanding or 
expectations of the real nature of political parties, Matolino (2013:146) goes on to say that 
since parties1 are constituted by people or groups of people of different political views, it 
could happen that these people or groups take their views seriously; to such an extent that 
consensus would not be possible. “The decisions on arriving at what is the way to proceed 





pledged themselves to” (Matolino 2013:147). He points out that although Wiredu claims that 
consensus is not about moral judgments, but rather about agreeing on the best action, this 
does not diminish the possibility of the seriousness of differences in views. Matolino 
(2013:147) gives an example of the issue of same-sex marriage and argues that there could be 
serious differences on whether same-sex couples should be allowed equality and protection 
under the law, and thus a debate on this issue would involve people’s moral values. 
Matolino, however, contradicts himself here from his earlier argument. Matolino (2009:42) 
contended that humans as political entities can willingly co-operate. Again, he (2009:40) also 
contended that: “…any competition and divergent interests that do not take each other into 
consideration will not promote the pursuit of any interests at all.” As Wiredu (1997:183) 
explains, consensus itself presupposes diversity of ideas; and there has to be a will to 
consensus so that dialogue can lead to the willing suspension of disagreement.  
With Matolino’s disagreement with Wiredu that consensus may as well entail moral 
judgments, and giving an example of the issue of same sex marriage,  Wiredu’s 
argument is as such that consensus involves more than one party, and thus is about issues that 
affect everyone in a society at large. Again, consensus is about deciding on the way forward; 
as Wiredu points  out, “…Dialogue can work...for smoothing edges to produce compromises 
that are agreeable to all or at least not obnoxious to any” (Wiredu 1997:304). Wiredu might 
have perceived that there are personal moral issues that do not necessarily affect others and 
thus not needing consensus.  
On the other hand, however, there are moral issues that may be affecting others, like same- 
sex marriages, the example given by Matolino. To begin with, the issue of homosexuality is 
indeed a challenging one, and would as well need the guidelines of reaching a consensus, 
which requires willingness of all parties of a particular society to compromise, in dialogue 
towards a smooth and sustainable way forward. 
Matolino observes that since party1 could gain political leadership through                                                                         
good arguments, consensus democracy could then be of one-party polity; however, for some 
good i.e. one party polity which could yield a good outcome. Matolino, however, seems to 
have dismissed the functioning of the Ashanti political system, where decisions were made 
from the most elementary party or level of governance, the lineage. In other words, every 
adult member in every family had a right to be involved in the dialogue from which national 





that would be the agreed action of all members of the society. In other words, the 
persuasiveness would have won the reasoning of all members of the society.       
Matolino, surprisingly further, asserts that consensual democracy down-plays freedom as a 
fundamental aspect of democracy. This may be correct because consensus involves 
compromise. However, consensual democracy is the best way to co-operation, which is a pre-
requisite to avoid conflicts, thus the best way to sustainable development, as Wiredu 
(2001:233) implies.  
 Matolino (2009:42), nevertheless, having shown an understanding that people need to agree 
on the way forward, he still goes further to disagreement with Wiredu, by asserting that it 
would not be plausible for anyone to argue that there could ever be a situation whereby all 
members of a society stand a chance to benefit the same way. He thus holds that it is rather 
more plausible that some individuals and groups will benefit more than the others if certain 
positions are to be adopted. Within party2 also, therefore, Matolino (2013:149) is of the view 
that some parties1 will benefit over others and those who cannot abide by how decisions are 
secured in party2 would be regarded as anti-social by the supporters of party2.   
Matolino, however, the overall impression that consensual democracy gives is rather that it 
may not provide an environment where everyone benefits in the same way, but it provides a 
milieu, where everyone has a chance to benefit in the same way. Wiredu (1997:189), states 
that consensual democracy is not perfect, but it is better than one party and multi-party 
politics.      
Matolino, lastly, criticizes Wiredu further for not explaining with clarity  how consensus is 
attained, how all parties1 become party2; besides suggesting that it could be attained through 
rational dialogue and giving an example of how it was attained in the Akans’ politics. 
Matolino (2013:150) thus contends that modern Africa is too complex and thus dialogue is 
not enough to secure consensus. For him, Wiredu’s account ignores diversity and pluralism 
that characterise current African polities. Wiredu (2001:233), however, rightly refutes the 
idea that consensual democracy can only work in pre-colonial, less complex African politics 
by pointing out that consensual democracy has actually been adopted by some European 





2. 3 Theology of Reconstruction  
2. 3.1 Reconstruction Theology Paradigm   
The Theology of Reconstruction was developed subsequent to other major African theologies 
such as Inculturation Theology and African Liberation Theology. Jesse Mugambi, a Kenyan 
theologian, publicised the Theology of Reconstruction since 1990 (Maluleke 1997:23). 
Mugambi became the father of Reconstruction Theology after presenting it  at the Nairobi 
meeting of March 1990,  to which he was invited by the All African Conference of Churches 
(AACC) (Gathogo 2006:4). The purpose of the meeting was to reflect on the future of the 
Churches in Africa. Mugambi reflected on this in the same month in which Namibia obtained 
independence, and a month after the release of Mandela from prison (Gathogo 2007:1).  
Reconstruction Theology was thus officially introduced in African theological studies as a 
model (Gathogo 2006:2). Passion for pan-Africanism is evident in Mugambi’s work on his 
theology of reconstruction, as he treats Africa as having the same problems. This passion was 
fuelled by his early childhood, from the influence of his parents and grandparents who were 
both involved in the Church and local leadership; and who witnessed the horrific effects of 
World War II and the Mau Mau liberation movement in Kenya. In their leadership, his 
parents and grandparents sought a restoration of African identity and reconciliation against 
unnecessary wars and divisions in Africa that were externally initiated due to the tensions 
between the West and the East in the Cold War. (Gathogo 2006:6).  
The first publication of Mugambi’s first presentation on reconstruction theology at the AACC 
meeting in Kenya was published the following year (1991), by the AACC, under the title: 
The future of the Churches and the Churches of the Future, Mugambi highlighted the state of 
Africa which was in economic crisis. He also highlighted the remarkable growth of the 
Churches in Africa, and realised the possible causality of despair due to economic poverty for 
religious growth (Mugambi 1991:29). He states that Africa is the most religious continent, 
yet the most long-suffering and poverty-stricken continent. He refers to the popularised 
concept of the uselessness and diminution of religion in the modernised society since the 
1960s, however, noting that some social scientists such as Emile Durkheim and Max Weber 
saw the usefulness of religion in societies. Mugambi (1995:35) thus warns that there is 





Africa has to make her own myths and to interpret her old ones. A society that is incapable of 
making its own myths and interprets its old ones becomes extinct (Mugambi 1995:37).  
A vanishing people, must be replaced by the myth of a resurgent, or resilient people. The 
myth of a desperate people must be replaced by the myth of a people full of hope. The 
myth of a hungry people must be replaced by the myth of a people capable of feeding 
itself, and so on (Mugambi 1995:38).  
 Mugambi asserted that the Churches of Africa has to express love, faith and hope in spite of 
the world’s hopelessness towards Africa (Mugambi 1991:30).  
Some of the major African crises include food shortage, financial indebtedness to the 
international community, over- population, technological and knowledge crisis, on the most 
religious continent (Mugambi 1991:32). He thus asserts that there has to be an African 
theological response. Mugambi rightly highlights the pluralistic reality of African religiosity, 
and also points out that religion carries the power to make a positive social change or to cause 
social damage (Mugambi 1991:33).    
Mugambi (1991:33) thus invited the African Churches, together with all non-Christian 
Africans  
…to share in common responsibility with us; to interpret theologically the events we are 
experiencing; restoring hope to those who have become desperate; joy to those who have 
become sorrowful; courage to those who have become fearful and liberty to those who 
are bound in various forms of captivity [Isaiah 61:1-2; Lk 4: 16:22]).  
As he calls African religiosity to an awakening, he challenges Christian organisations and 
individuals to take up their mandate to play a prophetic role. “The mandate from God through 
Jesus Christ is that the Christian faith should bring about peace on earth and good will among 
human kind” (Mugambi 1991:34).   
Mugambi bases his theology of reconstruction on the African political changes marking the 
end of colonialism in Africa and the declaration of African republics, the end of the Cold War 
and Apartheid, arguing that due to these changes it was time to move from a theme of 
liberation theology of the Exodus metaphor, by which Africans have been equated to the 
Israelites in captivity (Mugambi 1991:34). Mugambi asserted that the Exodus metaphor is no 





equality in Zimbabwe and South Africa, and that a new theological metaphor  was needed, 
thus proposing the theology of reconstruction (Mugambi1991:34).  
“Quite obviously, Africa today needs a theology of reconstruction, just as King Josiah needed 
such a theology in 622 BC. We need to shift our theological gears from liberation to 
reconstruction” (Mugambi 1991:35). 
Mugambi notes that some Israelites, after the bondage in Egypt, remained in ideological 
bondage by continuing to rely on Egypt as their point of reference. “The book of 
Deuteronomy challenges the people to rely on God, and to establish their own identity while 
maintaining friendly relations with all the neighbours” (Mugambi 1991:35). By this 
statement, Mugambi makes an honest plea for the restoration of African dignity. It is to be 
noted that with African restoration, Africa remains friendly with the neighbours.  
Mugambi points out that the book of Deuteronomy highlights the necessity of the role of the 
later generation to revive the plans that will match the new circumstances (Mugambi 
1991:35). In comparison to this, therefore, reconstruction ought to be the new priority for 
Africans since the 1990s.  
He suggests that Christian evangelization could change from a non-contextual reflection on 
the Biblical revelation to a contextual theology. He defines theology as the systematic 
articulation of human response to revelation in a particular situation and context (Mugambi 
1991:40). He thus emphasises that theology requires the knowledge and engagement of other 
disciplines such as science; otherwise theology will be disqualified due to its failure to 
reconcile Biblical teaching with scientific truth (Mugambi 1991:42).      
With the positive political changes in Africa, the Churches have  to move to other texts such 
as the Exilic motif (Jeremiah), the Deuteronomic motif (Josiah), the Restoration motif (Isaiah 
61:4), reconstructive motif (Haggai and Nehemiah), and so on (Mugambi 1995: 42).   
Mugambi (1995:12) states that the theology of reconstruction involves many disciplines. The 
terms construction and reconstruction belong to the engineering vocabulary. An engineer has 
to ensure that the design of the construction fit its function when the construction is complete. 
The engineer reconstructs when the constructed complex becomes dysfunctional for its 
purpose. In the reconstruction process, new ideas may be introduced into the design, and 
some old aspects may be discarded (Mugambi 1995:12). Furthermore, the theology of 





social reconstruction has to do with re-organisation of some aspects of a society, to make it 
more proactive (Mugambi 1995:12).  
Mugambi clarifies that: 
Theology of reconstruction should be reconstructive rather than destructive, inclusive 
rather than exclusive; proactive rather than reactive; complementary rather than 
competitive; integrative rather than disintegrative; programme-driven rather than project-
driven; people-centred rather than institution-driven; deed-oriented rather than word-
oriented; participatory rather than autocratic; regenerative rather than degenerative; 
future-sensitive rather than past-sensitive; co-operative rather than confrontational; 
consultative rather than oppositional (Mugambi 1995:xv). 
In his theology of reconstruction, Mugambi profoundly emphasises African responsibility. 
For instance, he asserts that: “this shift involves discerning alternative social structures, 
symbols, rituals, myths and interpretations of Africa’s social reality by Africans themselves, 
irrespective of what others have to say about the continent and its people” (Mugambi 
1995:12). He adds that:  
Reconstruction is the new priority for African nations in the 1990s. The churches and 
their theologians will need to respond to this new priority in relevant fashion, to facilitate 
this process of reconstruction. The process will require considerable efforts of 
reconstruction and confidence-building. It will require reorientation and retraining 
(Mugambi 1991:36).  
Mugambi posits that reconstruction happens on three levels. The first level is personal 
reconstruction. Social reconstruction begins with individuals as maintained in traditional 
Christian Theology (Mugambi 1991:15). Mugambi refers to Biblical texts as well as 
Christian hymns. He refers to Biblical verses that speak on personal reconstruction such as 
Luke 18:9-14, Matthew 23:1-13 and Luke 12-13 (15-16), and hymns such as Amazing grace 
and Take my life and let it be. Reflecting on texts such as Matthew 23:1-13 and Luke 12-13, 
he elaborates that personal reconstruction is  a continuous and watchful process and not static  
(Mugambi 1992:15). He asserts that Jesus made it clear that constructive change must start 
from the motives and intentions of the individual. He uses a well-chosen example to illustrate 
this more clearly through the contracting attitudes of the tax collector and the Pharisee in 
Luke 18:9-14. The tax collector was self-transformed, while the Pharisee was self-righteous 





appropriate disposition of individual members of a community concerned, especially its 
leaders to social transformation (Mugambi 1995:16).   
The second level on which reconstruction occurs is cultural reconstruction. According to 
Mugambi (1995:17), cultural reconstruction encompasses a number of aspects. He defines 
culture as: 
The cumulative product of people’s activities in all aspects of life, in their endeavour to 
cope with their social and natural environment. Its components include politics, 
economics, ethics, aesthetics, and religion. In each of these components, reconstruction is 
necessary from time to time to ensure that the social structures are finely tuned to the 
needs of the people (Mugambi 1995:17).  
Mugambi thus argues that in the 21st Century, it is up to African Christians to redirect 
Christianity in line with African culture (Mugambi 1995:49). This has to be reflected in 
African cultural rituals, symbols, vestments, music, liturgy, architecture, metaphors and 
theological emphasis (Mugambi 1995:43).The cultural components of religion, economics, 
politics, ethics, and aesthetics are complementary, and each one is important for the social 
structure of a society (Mugambi 1995:17).  
Mugambi, goes further to explain the role of each component of the culture. Religion is said 
to have the potential to provide “the world-view which synthesises everything that is 
cherished by individuals as corporate members of the community” (Mugambi 1995:17). 
Although this is the case with religion according to Mugambi, he also bears in mind that 
religion is not shared by all members of a society and  argues that religion must  respect the 
intelligence and integrity of an individual who is not part of thereof (Mugambi 1995:67).  
For Mugambi, economics refers to the management of resources, politics to the management 
of social influence and ethics to the system of values (Mugambi 1995:17). “When priorities 
change, the value system also has to be adjusted, either to remind the people of forgotten 
priorities, or to re-organise the hierarchy of values” (cited in Farisani 2002:101) Aesthetics 
refers to the sense of proportion and symmetry in all aspects of life, which, like ethics, 
require adjustment from time to time to suit the changing values of a society (Mugambi 1995: 
17).  
The third level that Mugambi proposes on which reconstruction ought to happen is ecclesial 





number of elements. It involves the life and organisation of the Church community. It also 
encompasses the elements of cultural reconstruction because the Churches are communities 
(Mugambi 1995:17). The role of theology is to help the Church adjust itself to the changing 
social demands in which it lives (Mugambi 1995:15). What Mugambi infers is that the role of 
theology is to give the Church a standpoint from which it can respond to the changing social 
demands. Mugambi (1995:42) also strongly argues that the Church, on the basis of the 
Scriptures, should be part of creating culture, rather than merely adjust to it. 
The reconstruction of the Church should begin at the lowest level just as the strength of a tree 
depends on the depth and strength of its roots (Mugambi 1995:140), and the Church’s 
reconstruction must occur according to  today’s world.  
Ecclesial reconstruction should include “mythological reformulation, doctrinal teaching, 
social rehabilitation, ethical direction, ritual celebration, and experiential (personal) response” 
(Mugambi 1995:17). 
Mugambi, reflecting on Romans 12:2, upholds the gospel as the informing or the objective 
ground to culture; the gospel thus being the challenge or the model standard for every culture. 
In this way, no culture can claim to be superior to another (Mugambi 1995:42). “Mugambi 
declares that each culture has its strengths and weaknesses, but qualitative comparisons have 
no ethical justification” (cited in Farisani 2002:102).With this, Mugambi bears in mind that 
African culture has very often been seen as incompatible with Christian faith; Western 
culture was regarded as the only vehicle through which  the Christian faith could be 
expressed (Mugambi 1995:42).  
Mugambi (1995:45) highlights an important point that in order for the Church to be effective, 
there has to be unity.  
The most pertinent question for African Christians with regards to Gospel, and culture in 
the ecumenical context, is whether denominational self-centeredness will be of any 
relevance in the process of social transformation. The emphasis, as Jesus and St. Paul 
continue to remind us, should be on the unity of all Christians in their witness to the 
world (John 14-17; I Corinthians 12). A house that is divided against itself cannot stand 
(Luke 11: 17) (Mugambi 1995: 43). 
With the emphasis on  the gospel, that it  ought to be the framework within which culture is 
shaped, Mugambi 1995:41) emphasises the training of Church leaders in all areas of social 





management. The Churches should be the role models in managing the community and 
resources (Mugambi 1995:42-43). Mugambi; in his 1995 publication, From Liberation to 
reconstruction: African Christian Theology after the Cold War; addresses the three levels of 
reconstruction briefly; whereas one would have wished him to elaborate more especially on 
the ecclesial reconstruction. Nevertheless for this reason, he feels that “it suffices to paint the 
mural of reconstruction in broad outline, hoping that others can supply the details with finer 
brushes and in more varied colours” (1995:17). Specific aspects of ecclesial reconstruction 
that could be developed by others are:  “management structures, financial policies, pastoral 
care, human resources development, research, family education, service and witness” 
(Mugambi 1995:17). Each of these projects he points out, is deeply involving, and needs 
specialist attention.   
  2.3.3 Critiquing Mugambi  
Mugambi’s theology of reconstruction has received numerous responses, some praising it, 
and others criticising it. Mugambi has been criticised by other African theological scholars 
such as Tinyiko Maluleke and Biblical scholar Farisani Elelwani, among others. Maluleke’s 
criticism of Mugambi’s theology of reconstruction is around the effects of neo-colonialism on 
Africa. Maluleke (1997:23) argues that Mugambi assumes that the end of the Cold War has 
immediate significance for ordinary Africans and that the new world order is really “new” 
and really “orderly” for Africans; yet Mugambi himself also points out that African problems, 
poverty, wars, dictatorship and Western control are unlikely to decrease.  
On the other hand, Karamaga Andre (1993:111) one of the African theology scholars who 
have responded to Mugambi’s reconstruction theology favourably rightly points out that after 
the Israelites were liberated from Egypt and after their journey in the wilderness, they did not 
find a country full of milk and honey as it was written in the Bible. The only certainty they 
enjoyed was God’s presence (Karamaga 1993:111). In the same way, after colonialism and 
cold war, Africa is not free from poverty. Karamaga (1993:111), again rightly states that 
“With the metaphor of liberation, Africans have wasted much time complaining, as if they 
were expecting to receive compensation from the colonialists.” Bearing Karamaga’s 
argument in mind, Maluleke’s criticises Mugambi’s theology, in the sense that he did not 
consider the effects of neo-colonialism, should rather be that Mugambi assumes that African 





Cold War and Apartheid, are partly self-induced through corruption of African political 
leaders.  
Maluleke (1997:23) further criticised the idea that Mugambi’s theology of reconstruction 
minimises the value of previous African theologies of enculturation and liberation, into which 
African theologians have invested much time and effort to develop. Furthermore, Mugambi 
does not show a clear separation from liberation theology to reconstruction theology.  He thus 
holds that we cannot continue without recognising what has already been achieved (Maluleke 
1997:23). Mugambi, however, although enthusiastic for a move to a theology of 
reconstruction, he does not merely intend to diminish what has been done in African theology 
without reason, especially liberation theology from which he proposes a move to 
reconstruction. Mugambi explains this in his latest book (2003) on the theology, which he 
wrote in response to the criticisms.  
For Mugambi, enculturation is a paradigm that had been developed in Catholic theology 
circles, with the intention to bring an already culturally influenced gospel to Africa. “There is 
a risk that in the name of enculturation, culturally conditioned interpretations of the Gospel 
are adopted and translated into the cultures in ‘the mission-field’” (Mugambi 2003:72). 
According to Mugambi, enculturation is part of liberation; i.e. liberation from other cultural 
influences that came through the gospel. He states that cultural liberation is a sub-set of total 
liberation (Mugambi 2003:73). Mugambi’s understanding of enculturation makes sense in 
view of his reconstruction theology, because a people motivated for reconstruction desire to 
hold on to a culture of their own.  
Mugambi, went on to respond to the criticism of not showing a departure from liberation to 
reconstruction theology in the third chapter of the book. He responds to this by stating firstly, 
that liberation and reconstruction are not mutually exclusive. Rather, they are related. 
Liberation precedes reconstruction. Liberation involves war or non-violent strategies. In the 
areas where liberation is achieved, reconstruction begins, and post-war rehabilitation is the 
first step of reconstruction. In other words, reconstruction can begin in the liberated areas 
although liberation may be on-going in other areas. Reconstruction therefore, follows 
liberation.   





Liberation and reconstruction are social-political processes within history, in specific 
cultural contexts. The actors in those processes are ordinary human beings, with 
determination to emancipate themselves from their oppressors. Religious commitment 
often provides the motivation and the rationalisation of the struggle, but the results are 
expected within history (Mugambi 2003:61-62).       
Thirdly, in both processes (liberation and reconstruction), the distinction between theology 
and ideology is often obscure because both the oppressed and the oppressors find theological 
justification for their actions (Mugambi 2003:62).  
Fourthly, Mugambi asserts that as these are human processes, both liberation and 
reconstruction can never be accomplished with perfection. Therefore, the measure for the 
success of liberation ought to be self-determination rather than watching out for the 
realisation of the perfect achievement of liberation (Mugambi 2003:62). What Mugambi 
meant here was that there is no need to wait for or to anticipate perfect achievement of 
liberation, which according to him cannot be achieved in a perfect form as a human process. 
Relative achievement of liberation can lead to reconstruction and so on.        
Fifthly, “the processes of liberation and reconstruction within the same community involve 
all sectors of the population, including religious leadership” (Mugambi 2003:62). Therefore, 
all responses in the processes have to be appreciated. Both liberation and reconstruction are 
processes that require co-operation due to their nature. These processes may also be initiated 
by a group that decides to fight for liberation on the part of the masses. This group also may 
initiate reconstruction after liberation is achieved. However, these are not sustainable 
processes to liberation and especially to reconstruction, since they involve only some 
individuals of the group, while other members of the society remain dormant, inactive and 
excluded in social decision-making (Mugambi 2003:62). 
Sixth and lastly, Mugambi (2003:63) points out that the processes of liberation and 
reconstruction are different. Liberation requires war while reconstruction requires nation-
building. 
Another criticism of Mugambi’s theology of reconstruction by  Maluleke is that Mugambi 
offers Biblical  and social-political justifications that are not developed, and that his social-
political argumentation for the need for social reconstruction in Africa is stronger than his 





comprehend Mugambi’s aim in his writing. Mugambi clearly states that the themes he 
addresses need to be further addressed in detail by others (Mugambi 1995:17).  
Unlike Maluleke, Farisani (2002:117) contends that theology of reconstruction is relevant for 
Africa, and that the theology must be afforded the credit for having perceived the changes 
that Africa has gone through, and for perceiving that this requires a theological response. 
Like Maluleke, however, Farisani also criticises Mugambi for not critically developing his 
Biblical references. He points out that:  
...by using the reconstruction theme, in Ezra-Nehemiah without isolating the ideological 
agenda of the text and identifying the group which is dominant in the text, has 
inadvertently identified reconstruction as that which is driven by returned exiles at the 
exclusion of the am haaretz. Such reading is insensitive to the plight of the am haaretz 
(Farisani 2002:112-113).  
Farisani (2002:87) thus contends that Mugambi’s Biblical usage is not fully hermeneutically 
developed, since the Biblical basis of reconstruction theology [Ezra-Nehemiah] is biased 
against am haaretz [enemies or adversaries], which refers to those Jews who had not gone 
into the Babylonian exile in 587 BC. The returnees that were led by Nehemiah from exile 
therefore used the name am haaretz, to refer to those who had not gone into the exile 
(Farisani 2002:87). Furthermore, Farisani (2002:86-112) argues that many other Biblical texts 
are mentioned in the composition of theology of reconstruction without scrutinising them.  
This criticism is valid and needed a response which Mugambi gives in his latest book. 
Mugambi states that “The method of theology within the reconstruction paradigm is 
necessarily multi-disciplinary, ecumenical, and inclusive” (Mugambi 2003:30). Mugambi 
(2003:i), being aware of Farisani’s criticism of the theology, points out that the emphasis of 
the theology the sharp contrast between the leadership of Moses and that of Nehemiah. The 
character of Nehemiah’s leadership is that of a reconstructive leader leading a people who are 
highly motivated to rebuild (Mugambi 2003:172). He goes on to say that although there was 
social-economic divides amongst the people that were found on the land and the returnees, 
Nehemiah’s stance was more in sympathy with the oppressed than with the elite. “This is the 
attribute that qualifies him to belong to reconstructive leadership. We are challenged to 





Although Mugambi speaks broadly about African problems, the theology of reconstruction 
can be applied to many specific African contexts. For Charles Villa-Vicencio, a South 
African theologian whose work was published before Mugambi’s first publication, although 
Mugambi had presented it before, applied it effectively in the post-apartheid South African 
context.  
Villa-Vicencio’s work on the theology was published in 1992 titled: A Theology of 
Reconstruction: Nation building and human rights. His contribution shows that theology of 
reconstruction can be applied to any social context that is seeking reconstruction. Mugambi’s 
assumption, that African problems are largely similar therefore, appears to be valid. Villa-
Vicencio claims that he addresses social issues of post-apartheid South Africa’s multicultural, 
multiracial and religiously diverse society. Similar to  Mugambi, Villa-Vicencio’s plea in his 
work is that post-Cold War African theology should engage in serious dialogue with 
democracy, human rights, law-making, nation-building and economics, in order to ensure that 
human life is improved (cited in Maluleke 1997:22).  
Villa-Vicencio argues that post-apartheid South Africa presents new tasks to the Churches. A 
theology of reconstruction is needed that ought to involve law, economics, politics, and 
related disciplines. Like Mugambi, Villa-Vicencio (1992:274) also holds that liberation 
involves freedom, and that reconstruction begins in liberated areas. However, for Villa-
Vicencio (1992:274), reconstruction also concerns safe-guarding the achieved liberation. 
Furthermore, reconstruction disturbs the social status quo; it is to discern and to explore 
social circumstances of a given society (Villa-Vicencio 1992:275).  
This analysis should not be biased in order for the existent problem to be discovered. For 
him, reconstruction theology ought to be the framework for social transformation through 
action and reflection. In this way, he agrees with Mugambi that the theology should be 
engaging with other disciplines in its response to social issues. Villa-Vicencio adds that there 
is a need for a language that is understood by people from other disciplines (Villa-Vicencio 
1992:277).  Also like Mugambi, Villa-Vicencio perceives it as vital for the diversity of 
religions to join to find solutions for the common social good (Villa-Vicencio 1992:277).  
Within post-apartheid South Africa, Villa-Vicencio (1992:7) asserts that the theology of 
reconstruction related to post-exilic theology is relevant to South African returnees from 
exile. The theology of reconstruction thus, according to him “involves the important task of 





inclusive (non-racial and democratic) society built on the very values denied the majority of 
people under apartheid” (Villa-Vicencio 1992:7-8).  According to him, liberation theology is 
associated with saying “No” to any form of exploitation, whereas the theology of 
reconstruction is associated with saying “Yes” to positive political social-economic and 
cultural changes. However, he also maintains that reconstruction theology also has a duty of 
saying “No” to any form of oppression in the new society. Like Mugambi, Villa-Vicencio 
argues that the theology of liberation has been grounded in the Biblical theme of exodus to 
the slavery of Israelites in Egypt. That is to say, liberation is about the struggle outside 
bondage, while reconstruction is about rebuilding (Villa-Vicencio 1992:24).  
The response of liberation theology to a Church on the side of oppressive regimes has 
been part of the hope and the promise of people and a Church in exile. It must now be 
translated into a theology of home-coming and nation-building (Villa-Vicencio 1992:32). 
2.4 Conclusion  
This chapter has discussed the two theoretical frameworks used in this study namely the 
consensual democracy of Kwasi Wiredu and the theology of reconstruction of Jesse 
Mugambi. Consensual democracy will be used in chapter three to guide the assessment of the 
state of the post-genocide Rwandan democracy. The overall theme that is described in this 
study in the consensual democracy theoretical framework is that inclusion of all in political 
affairs is crucial as far as sustainable development or sustainable avoidance of destructive 
social conflicts and violence is concerned. In order to achieve this, as depicted in the theory, 
political leadership has to begin at grassroots level.  
This can only occur when all the people realise the need for consensus on the basis of the 
simple reality that there will always be conflicts as long as some assume political power with 
the intention of excluding others. As a result, Wiredu holds that a non-part polity is a solution 
as well as evidence of being reasonable. As for the theology of reconstruction, some writers 
have raised that it is broad and Mugambi does not specify whether the theology of 
reconstruction addresses the Churches or the diverse society at large. It is assumed in this 
study that the theology addresses the Churches and thus it will be used in the fourth chapter 
with post-genocide Rwandan Churches, focussing on the RCC in particular, with an overall 
introduction about the Church in general. The theology of reconstruction summons the 
Churches to become contextually minded in the African context after independence. This 





tandem with the current context. It challenges church leaders to be knowledgeable in other 
fields in order to understand their contexts and to offer a theological interpretation 
accordingly. This theology also challenges the Churches to be part of the cultural change and 
social influence, in view of the fact that Africa is the most religious continent. The theology 
of reconstruction also holds that ecumenism is vital for the social and cultural influence of 






AN ASSESSMENT OF THE STATE OF DEMOCRACY IN POST-
GENOCIDE RWANDA 
3.1 Introduction  
Rwanda’s socio-political life throughout history has been characterised by conflicts and 
violence between the two main ethnic groups, the Hutus and the Tutsis. It is only after the 
1994 genocide that the identification of Rwandans according to ethnicity was disbanded to 
improve social cohesion, reconciliation and inclusive political space and development. The 
interest in this chapter is to assess the state of democracy in post-genocide Rwanda in view of 
the proposed theoretical framework, the consensual democracy of Kwasi Wiredu. By doing 
so, this chapter reviews sources whose focus is on the transition from the government which 
ruled during the time the genocide took place to the current post-genocide government. The 
chapter continues by reviewing the current constitution’s decentralisation policy as being a 
major indication of a positive political and democratic change. The chapter also reviews 
sources which criticise the post-genocide democracy and looks at the presence of organised 
opposition parties of Rwandans against the post-genocide Rwandan government.           
3.2  The transition  
 
As discussed in the background to the context of the study in chapter one, Rwandan political 
life had been characterised by power shifts involving tensions and violence between the two 
main rival ethnic groups, namely the Hutus and the Tutsis. Furthermore, the elites of the 
dominant ethnic group were at the forefront of political leadership and social influence. 
Webley Radha (2001:6) points out that it has been a scholarly discussion about the roots of 
Rwandan ethnic differences, and rightly employs a theory of anthropologist Mahmood 
Mammdani which argues that ethnic identity has to be understood as being directly related to 
the way in which power is organised in relation to the state. Webley (2001:6) refers to 
Catharine Newbury, a prominent Rwandan historian who also maintains that ethnic 
identification is a dynamic process that develops in relation to state power. Webley (2001:6) 
thus rightly holds that ethnicity in Rwanda is about power and this is clearly reflected in the 
pre-genocide ethnic conflicts. In other words, the concern or principle of consensual 





realised throughout the Rwandan pre-genocide history, due to ethnic ideologies.              
Regarding the start of post-genocide political conditions, Reyntjens (2005) notes that when 
the RPF took office on 19 July 1994, it adopted the constitution of power sharing that was 
amended by the Arusha Peace Accord. All the political parties took seats in the government 
except Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le Developpement - National 
Revolutionary Movement for Development–Rwanda (MRND), and the extremist Hutu party 
Coalition Defence Republic (CDR), both which were banned for their leading role in the 
genocide (Reyntjens 2005:15-16). 
In the adoption of the constitution of power sharing that was amended by the Arusha Peace 
Accords, Faustin Twagiramungu, a Hutu from Mouvement Democratique Republicain 
(MDR) became the prime minister, and a Hutu, Pasteur Bizimungu who had joined RPF in 
the 1990’s was appointed as president (Reyntjens 2005:15-16). In the interim period, as 
pointed out by Gasamagera Wellars (1994-2003), before consensual democracy was adopted, 
the country was governed by a set of texts called fundamental law. These included the 1991 
Constitution, the Arusha Peace Accord, the RPF Declaration of July 1994 and the political 
parties’ agreement of November 1994 (Gasamagera 2007:4). 
Meanwhile, in 2000, President Bizimingu resigned due to personal reasons. In 2002, he was 
arrested and accused of illegal political activity, inciting violence, and fraud (The Global 
Integrity report 2009). His arrest and sentence to 15 years in prison came just as he had begun 
to form an opposition political party. He was granted a presidential pardon and released in 
April 2007 (The global integrity report 2009). The global Integrity report (2009) continues to 
report that former president Bizimungu’s deputy, Kagame Paul, was appointed president by 
members of  Parliament after the resignation of Bizimungu, and was later elected, winning 
95% of the votes in the August 2003 presidential elections. Without a need to investigate who 
was at fault, this shows competition for political power and influence, without regard to 
dialogue and consensus in political matters. This was, however, before consensus was 
established within the political parties which will be discoursed on below.  
There are many changes in the political arena reflected in the new constitution, demonstrating 
the spirit of the new government to be and to make a difference, as it was initially shown by 
the act of adopting the power sharing constitution after the end of the genocide. Gasamagera 
Wellars (2007) in his paper presented to the seventh Global Forum for reinventing 





the 1962 constitution after independence from colonialism and that of 1978 placed power in 
the hands of  the government  and into the hands of the president, allowing him to deal with  
public affairs as he wished (Gasamagera 2007:4). 
It is in this spirit, therefore, that “a process was launched to design and draft a new 
constitution that would govern the country emerging from genocide, where citizens had lost 
trust in the governing system” (Gasamagera 2007:4).  
Another reason for a new constitution  was the fundamental law consisting of a set of texts 
that governed the country in the interim period (1994-2003) and which did not seem to be 
applicable to the Rwandan problems of the post-genocide era (Gasamagera 2007:4). Contrary 
to the former constitutions that were formulated with some external influence, a team was 
formed  to carry out the making of the current constitution on the basis of consensus, and 
tasked to collect views from the  Rwandan population (Gasamagera 2007:4). 
The challenge was that in the democratic setting, political parties had to be involved. The 
population, on the other hand, questioned the credibility of the political parties, in view of 
their role in the past. It was also for this reason that a forum of political parties working on 
the basis of consensus was formed. A forum of political parties operating on the basis of 
consensual democracy is constituted in Article 55 of the Constitution.  The challenge that the 
community noted was dealing with an illiterate population and waiting on international 
donations (Gasamagera 2007:7).  
3.2.1  Principles of the Constitution and the decentralization policy: a move to a 
consensual democracy     
 
In 2000, the government adopted a national decentralisation policy through its established 
ministry of local government. In establishing local government, Rwanda was divided into 
four provinces including Kigali the capital city, thirty districts, four hundred and sixteen 
sectors, 2148  cells and 14,837 villages (Commonwealth Local Government Handbook 
2011/12:160). 
The national decentralisation policy states the administrative divisions in Rwandan 
vernacular language, Kinyarwanda as Intara (Province or provinces), Akarere (district in 





in singular), Utugari (cells) and Umudugudu (a village), Imidugudu (villages) (The Republic 
of Rwanda 2001).      
The divisions were made in the process of the Government’s resolve for decentralisation of 
governance since the year 2000.  The documented National Decentralisation Policy defines 
decentralisation as “the process of transferring power, authority, functions, responsibilities 
and the requisite resources from central governments” (Republic of Rwanda 2001:7).  
Rwanda has two types of government, these being a central and a local government. The role 
of the central government is listed in the National Decentralisation Policy as:  
 
Formation of national policies, national security, establishment of national bureaux of 
standards, foreign policy, international trade, industrial licensing, settlement policy and 
land use planning, organisation of judiciary, money, banking and national finance policy, 
prevention and control of natural calamities, construction and maintenance of national 
infrastructures, national education policy and culture, conservation and environmental 
protection policy, national health policy and exploitation of natural resources policy 
(Republic of Rwanda 2001:11-12). 
 
The policy goes on to state that some of the above responsibilities may be delegated to the 
lower levels of government, with exception of the following 
Formulation of national policies, establishment of national standards, the national 
security, foreign affairs, international trade, money, banking and national finance, 
national education and culture programmes, and national health programmes (The 
Republic of Rwanda 2001:12). 
 
It is argued in the national decentralisation policy that the urban centres have different needs 
to that of the rural areas such as a sewage system, street lighting, refuse collection and 
disposal. It is also argued that well-developed urban centres should provide the market for the 
agricultural produce from rural areas (The Republic of Rwanda 2001:26). The urban areas are 
thus divided into cites, municipalities, towns and trading centres.     
 
Intara (province) is the major linking agent between central and local government, the leader 
of Intara has a coordinating force including chair persons of counsels of Uturere (districts) 
that make up Intara. 
The decentralization policy was initiated by the central government as stated in the policy 





Rwanda is a typical example of decentralization from the top. Although the decentralisation 
policy reflects the values of consensual democracy of Wiredu in decentralising political 
power, it also differs from it. Firstly, the government is two-fold. There is central government 
and local government. On the other hand, the Ashanti government with which Wiredu 
elaborates his theory had one government in which every adult member of the society was 
involved in. Through representation, all the decisions were influenced from grassroots. 
Secondly, unlike the Ashanti government, the decentralisation policy was initiated and set by 
the central government, apparently with little drive from the masses. Thirdly, unlike the 
Ashanti government, there are some responsibilities, as the decentralisation policy states, that 
the central government has which the local governments do not have an influence on. It is to 
be noted, however, that the act of decentralisation created administrative divisions between 
provinces and cells that are similar to the administrative divisions of the Ashantis in which 
inclusive and consensual representation worked.         
 
Regarding the current constitution that was amended in 2003, the Government, in this 
constitution laid down favourable conditions in which consensual democracy can take roots. 
The motto of the Republic as stated in Article 6 of the constitution is “UNITY, WORK, and 
PATRIOTISM” (Rwandan Government 2003:2).Post-genocide Rwanda’s concern for 
consensual democracy is reflected in the current constitution. Preamble 5 and 6 assert that 
national awareness of the basic values of consensual democracy of consciousness that unity is 
needed for social economic advancement, tolerance and resolution of issues through dialogue 
is crucial (Rwandan Government 2003:1).  
The Constitution in preamble 11 raises a critical issue that faces Rwandan society, and which 
is strengthening to consensual democracy. This is fighting ignorance and developing human 
resources (Rwandan Government 2003:2).  Article 45 states that every citizen has a right to 
participate in the government of the country, directly or through freely chosen representatives 
(Rwandan Government 2003:7). As stated in the constitution, Article 52, unlike Wiredu’s 
non-party polity, post-genocide Rwanda is a multi-party state. However, all legally recognised 
political parties in post-genocide Rwanda are to be within a consultative forum, which is 
responsible for:  
1° facilitating exchange of ideas by political organizations on major 
issues facing the country; 
2° consolidating national unity;  





4° acting as mediators in conflicts arising between political 
organizations; 
5° assisting in resolving internal conflicts within a political 
organisation upon request by that political organisation.  
 
The forum's decisions shall always be taken by the consensus of the 
constituent organisations (Rwandan Government 2003:8).  
 
This forum, however, is not to prevent each political party from working as an independent 
party. Although there have been promising changes in the new government after the 
genocide, compared to the past as reflected in the constitution, and although consensus has 
been realised as a necessity for sustainable development, thus consensus being established 
amongst the political parties, Rwanda still has challenges as far as political parties are 
concerned as discussed below.    
.     
     
3.2.2 Criticisms against the state of democracy in post-genocide Rwanda: Is consensus 
democracy followed in practical terms?  
 
Although Rwanda has been praised for the development that has taken place, numerous 
commentators, especially international scholars, have expressed their concerns regarding the 
shortcomings of the current Rwandan democracy and government. Some of these are 
discussed below, including the works of some post-genocide Rwandan scholars such as 
Reyntjens and Longman.  
Kayumba6 Christopher and Kimonyo7 Jean-Paul (2006:174) comment that the transitional 
government was dominated by the RPF which was awarded the Presidency and Vice 
Presidency, justifying its powerful position by arguing that it had stopped the mass murders 
and had a duty to secure order. The RPF has since continued to dominate political life. 
Soon after Kagame became President, the Hutu elites in the government began to resign and 
go into exile, followed later by some Tutsi RPF leaders. In August 1995, Faustin 
                                                          
6Kayumba Christopher is a lecturer at the National University of Rwanda, whose research interests include 
media, peace, democratisation, civil society, and gender in transition societies (Zeeuw and Kumar [eds] 
2006:321).  
7Kimonyo Jean-Paul was the founder and director of the Centre for Conflict management at the National 
University of Rwanda. He is now an independent researcher and consultant, based in Kigali, Rwanda (Zeeuw 





Twagiramungu, the Prime Minister, Seth Sendanyoye, the Interior Minister and Alphonse 
Nkubito, the Minister of Justice resigned, followed by many others in lower positions 
(Reyntjens 2005:15-17). 
Due to   divisions within the RPF; many more political leaders resigned, including Joseph 
Sebarenzi, the speaker of the National Assembly and eventually even President Bizimungu 
himself, who was later accused of promoting  negative genocide ideologies (Reyntjens 
2005:15-18). 
Longman (2006:146) points out that the government inversion established a multi-party 
government, and appointed moderate Hutus to high positions of power. However, these 
leaders also resigned, complaining that they were denied any power in the government. 
Fraud was reported in the 2001 elections by the International Crisis Group who observed 
inconsistencies, lack of transparency and systematic control from the RPF. Other political 
parties were allowed to retain their positions only if they collaborated with the RPF 
(Reyntjens 2005:19).  
The government thus began to silence criticising voices, and many international operations, 
including NGOs, were banished. The leaders who had resigned were replaced by people close 
to Kagame. The consolidation of political power in the hands of Kagame and his small group 
of supporters grew by preventing any kind of criticism against the Government (Longman 
2006:146).  
Tensions continued to rise, followed by more resignations by political leaders, including 
Tutsis who were active members of the RPF. Workers in the media who criticised the 
government were threatened and a number of newspaper publications left the country to work 
from elsewhere (Reyntjens 2005:15-18). 
As a result of the 2003 elections, Rwanda replaced Sweden as the country with the highest 
percentage of women in Parliament (Longman 2006:133). Unlike the previous political 
regime, the RPF inversion not only promoted women’s rights, but it also demonstrated a 
considerable commitment to women’s inclusion in government (Longman 2006:139). 
However, Longman (2006:146) argues that, “Yet the significance of women’s high level of 
representation in parliament and in other government institutions is uncertain given the 





Mills Greg (2010:10), who served as strategic advisor to the Rwandan President in 2008, 
commented that RPF, under the leadership of Paul Kagame, has gained great admiration for 
liberating Rwanda from genocide and for demonstrating a strong commitment towards 
rebuilding the nation. However, Mills continues: 
 
But just underneath the diplomatic skin, Rwanda is in many respects no model reformer 
at all. Things look like they should work, but for some reason they don’t. And it is not 
just because of a lack of physical infrastructure and human capacity; it’s because the 
Rwandan ruling elite (because let’s face it, Rwanda is no democracy) led by Kagame is 
happy to run things its own way (Mills 2010:8-9). 
 
Daley (2009:149), a researcher from Oxford University and a lecturer on warfare, peace and 
post conflict reconstruction, forced migration and environmental issues in Africa, also argues 
in her work that relating the political issues of Rwanda merely to ethnicity is a mistake. 
Although ethnicity may be one division between the groups, differences between intra-ethnic 
elites are another. She notes that many observers of the post-genocide Rwandan government 
have pointed out the existence of a new clan, referring to the small Anglophone group that 
returned from Uganda and Tanzania, and who are the closest group to the President, Paul 
Kagame (Daley 2009).   
Chikwanha Anne (2010:12) also asserts that President Kagame has been overly criticised for 
side- stepping the country’s constitution by shunning the role of NGOs in the country. She 
goes on to say that these criticisms are concerned with President Kagame’s style of 
governance. She observes that only a “minority ethnic autocracy” is holding economic power, 
and that in order for true reconciliation to take place, there has to be equal sharing of power. 
However, the Hutus are largely excluded from important political leadership positions.  
According to Sebastian Silva-Leander (2008), if the current government wants to achieve 
long lasting peace, it must include democratisation in its reconciliation strategies. The former 
government was forced to consider democratisation due to international pressure, which 
caused tension between the two ethnic groups, resulting in the genocide. Similarly, if the 
current government does not consider democratisation, and meaningfully include the Hutu 
majority, tension is likely to flare up again in the future (Sebastian 2008:1601).  
In addition to the challenges from a number of scholars, there is also politically organised 






3.2.3 Rwandans’ Opposition against their Government: A Hazard for post-genocide 
consensual democracy   
 
Besides the legally registered political parties that are in the forum, there are also opposition 
parties that are not part of the forum, and thus not legally recognised by the state. The 
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDRL) was the first opposition against the 
post-genocide government. The FDRL is based in the Congo and consists mainly of soldiers 
from the former regime and other Hutu extremists. Unlike opposition political parties that 
were formed later, the FDRL does not clearly express its political motivation and uses force 
and violence (Reuters 2012:1). Opposition political leaders rose later, when the current 
Rwandan government began to be called a dictatorship.  
 
According to Rwanda Democracy, now (nd); designed and managed by some members of 
Rwandan opposition political parties, many exiled leaders express their concerns about the 
current government. For example, Forces Démocratique Unifiées8 (FDU-Inkingi) and the 
Rwandan National Congress (RNC) merged as opposition parties on January 26, 2011. RNC 
was formed in December 2010 by the former chief of staff and ambassador to India, 
Kayumba Nyamwasa, and a former chief of military intelligence, Patrick Karegeya, who 
went into exile after friction with the government. These two Rwandan former political 
leaders have been sentenced to twenty years imprisonment in absentia (Rwanda Information 
Portal 2010:5).The two leaders, currently in Switzerland, advocated for a democratic state 
governed in accordance with the principles of the rule of law, independence of the judiciary, 
respect for the inherent dignity of every citizen, equality and non-discrimination and 
promotion of reconciliation, solidarity and mutual respect amongst all Rwandans (Rwanda 
Democracy now [nd]). 
FDU-Inkingi is now a coalition of Rwandan opposition parties with a large base of active 
members in Rwanda, Europe, the United States of America and Canada (Ingabire.n.d). Its 
chairperson, Victoire Ingabire, returned to Rwanda from exile in the Netherlands in January 
2010, to register her political party in order to participate in the August 2012 presidential 
elections (Ingabire n.d).  In her speech after her arrival in Rwanda, she argued that there is no 
good government in Rwanda that will lead to the liberation of the nation. She added that the 
                                                          
8 Forces Démocratique Unifiées du Rwanda (French) meaning: United Democratic Forces of Rwanda. Inkingi is 





sadness of both the Hutus and the Tutsis have to be remembered.  In other words just like the 
deaths of Tutsis who were killed in the genocide are commemorated, so should the Hutus 
who were killed in the Congo must be commemorated (The Proxy Lake 2013). FDU-Inkingi 
was eventually barred from running the 2010 elections and its chairperson Ingabire Victoire 
was imprisoned, in October 2010, and later sentenced to eight years imprisonment, on the 
charges of terrorism, and threatening national security (BBC News 25 October 2010).     
In the interview Jean Baptiste Mberabahizi Jean-Baptist, the former Secretary General and 
spokesperson of FDU-Inkingi had with Jean-Pierre Bourras in 2008 (translated from French 
by Kouyate Mamadou), Mberabahizi pointed out that in order for a political party to be 
actively involved in Rwanda, it has to be part of the forum for political parties that is funded 
by the Rwandan government. Political parties have to take decisions by consensus, and this 
forum of political parties is driven by the leading RPF party. Mberabahizi thus concludes that 
Rwanda is in fact governed by one party (Kouyate9 2012).  
Mberabahizi states that the structure of State security, including the police and the 
intelligence services, are anti-democratic because opponents of the RPF are hunted down and 
silenced wherever they are, even abroad.  He gives an example of Seth Sendashonga who was 
assassinated in Nairobi in May 1998. He was a co-founder of a party that was a component of 
FDU-Inkingi (Kouyate 201210).  
Mberabahizi pointed out that political and military figures of the RPF have been suspected of 
having committed crimes against humanity and war crimes both in Rwanda and in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and that people who have been victims of these crimes have 
no way to speak for themselves (Kouyate 2012).  
While President Kagame claims that there is no ethnic discrimination, and that all Rwandans 
are treated equally, Mberabahizi argues that the President makes every effort to silence any 
voice that speaks out against ethnic discrimination in Rwanda (Kouyate 2012).  
In the interview, Mberabahizi also pointed out that the Rwandan electoral commission is 
chaired by a member of the executive committee of the RPF party, Chrysologue Karangwa, 
and thus the commission does not include members of any political party that is independent 
of the RPF (Kouyate 2012). Mberabahizi argued that other parties are not allowed to have 
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structures at local level, and repeated that there is no security for opposition parties. He stated 
that the first President after the genocide, President Pasteur Bizimungu, was jailed for years 
and then released without any lucid explanation, 11simply because he had tried to form a 
political party independent of the RPF. Mberabahizi also mentioned the case of Charles 
Kabanda who wanted to create a party just before the 2003 elections, and who was never 
given the chance, because the party seemed to be a threat to RPF (Kouyate 2012).     
Mberabahizi has written in the FDU-Inkingi newsletter, accusing President Paul Kagame of 
being behind the shooting of the plane that was carrying President Habyarimana and others 
before the start of the genocide. He believes that this act is responsible for the unleashing of 
the genocide (Mberabahizi 2012). Mberabahizi believes that the RPF has killed people in the 
Congo, demonstrating an intention to wipe out all Hutu individuals (Mberabahizi 2012).  
FDU-Inkingi asserts that the Rwandan government has disrupted the registration of the 
political party since January 2010 and its prominent leaders have been detained by the 
Rwandan government (FDU-Inkingi 2012).  
A number of former Rwandan political leaders12who have been exiled due to tension with the 
government and who are part of the formation of opposition parties wrote an article titled 
Rwanda briefing (August 2010). In this article they argue that although enormous credit must 
be given to President Kagame for the rebuilding of post-genocide Rwanda, the ruling party 
RPF under his leadership has denied any space for political participation. They go on to argue 
that, “State institutions, especially law enforcement agencies, the judiciary and security 
services, serve to protect the RPF’s, and ultimately Kagame’s, power monopoly instead of 
protecting the fundamental human rights of citizens” (Nyamwasa et al 201013).  
According to this group, the current dictatorship has excluded other political parties, the Hutu 
community and the majority Tutsis (Nyamwasa et al 2010). They also point out that excluded 
political leaders together with leaders from the pre-genocide government are continuing to 
build opposition against the dictatorship of Kagame’s government (Nyamwasa et al 2010).  
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On 31 October 2012, Rwandan Camara Hanyurwa posted on the Africa Great Lakes 
Democracy Watch BlogSpot, that a Rwandan Human Rights Commissioner, Tom Ndahiro, 
had provided a list of innocent people to the RPF, accusing them of having participated in the 
crimes of genocide. Hanyurwa argued that the people on the list were too young to have done 
what they have been accused of and thus have simply been accused because they bear a Hutu 
ethnicity or because they do not support the RPF. In his blog, Hanyurwa calls Ndahiro an 
extremist and a killer, full of poison and hatred against the Hutu people and those who 
resemble them in the Great Lakes region. Although he does not give a source, he presents the 
names that are on Ndahiro’s list and asks those identified to write to Ndahiro, making him 
aware that they are not afraid of the RPF and that the deaths of numerous people at the hands 
of the RPF in both Rwanda and the Congo did not solve Kagame’s problems (Hanyurwa 
201214).  
What this opposition indicates is that Rwanda is still a long way away from internal peace 
and security due to the problems with political parties, and this poses a threat to sustainable 
development. 
3.3 Concluding Remarks  
 
Consensual democracy has guided the assessment of democracy in post-genocide Rwanda. 
Even though consensual democracy applied in Rwanda it is different from that of Kwasi 
Wiredu they spring from the same sound reasoning and realisation that sustainable 
development cannot thrive in conflict situations. However, in the Rwandan context, the 
literature shows that there is no consensus between the political parties within the forum and 
those outside the forum. Post-genocide government has done its best to restore the country 
after the genocide, and Rwanda has taken a big stride regarding national reconciliation and 
peace building, compared to the previous regimes. Post-genocide government has also 
created strategic government structures that allow consensual democracy to work. The post-
genocide government however, is viewed as being dominated by the RPF as the leading 
political party; opposition political parties claim to have been excluded.  
This chapter therefore raises two questions. Firstly, with regards to Wiredu’s consensual 
democracy and post-genocide Rwanda, the question is whether there is willingness to a 
dialogue that will reach consensus with both the Rwandan leading party RPF and the political 
                                                          





opposition parties. In other words, the literature shows that there is hostility between the two; 
this hostility is a problem as far as consensual democracy is concerned, and thus as far as 
sustainable development is concerned. This also shows that peace and sustainable democracy 
is still a challenge in post-genocide Rwanda. This means the framework of consensual 
democracy has been established by the government but the implementation strategy seems to 
be hampered by the differences of partners in dialogue.   
 
Secondly, Wiredu’s consensual democracy and consensual democracy in post-genocide 
Rwanda differ in that the former is a non-party polity; the latter is a multi-party polity. The 
re-occurring challenge with Rwandan democracy is that the leading party has always been 
labelled Hutu or Tutsi. Therefore, whether Wiredu’s non-party polity could be an alternative 
for Rwanda’s contextually sustainable and inclusive democracy is a point of debate that this 






 POST-GENOCIDE CHURCHES  
 
4.1 Introduction  
This study holds that the Churches ought to use a social, political and economic language in 
their prophetic role in societies and nations who may not necessarily speak a theological 
language or have a theological motif. The Churches themselves however, need a critical and 
relevant theology as a standpoint for its prophetic responsibility. In this chapter, it is a point 
of concern whether reconstruction within the Churches has taken place; especially the RCC 
after the genocide considering its role before and during the genocide. Chapter three as a 
social analysis assessed the state of democracy in post-genocide Rwanda using consensual 
democracy of Kwasi Wiredu as a guide.  
After considering the contents of the theology of reconstruction in chapter two, this fourth 
chapter will focus on post-genocide Churches; with introductory comments about the 
Churches in general after the genocide, and focussing on the RCC; guided by the theology of 
reconstruction. As the theology of reconstruction was inspired by the political changes of the 
time, the Rwandan political history and the Churches also ought to inspire the Churches 
towards a vision of reconstruction. In other words, Post-genocide Rwanda offers an 
opportunity to the Churches to learn from history, and to be challenged to inspire positive 
political culture in the present and future of Rwanda.  This, according to the theology of 
reconstruction, is a responsibility of Rwandan theologians to draw contextually relevant 
theologies.           
4.2 Introductory comments on the Churches in Rwanda after the genocide: Is there  call 
to reconstruct?  
Pre-genocide time is a history that the Churches in Rwanda can draw significant lessons 
regarding their witness and social involvement. Reflecting on theology of reconstruction, 
post-genocide Rwanda is a time for Church men and women to reconstruct their theological 
stand, and to embark on a journey of building a culturally imbedded theology; and to build 





generally commented in Rwanda that Pentecostal Churches have become dominant in this 
country after the genocide. The diversity of cultures in post-genocide Rwanda due to exiled 
returnees from the neighbouring countries is demonstrated through the newly established 
Pentecostal Churches. These Churches were taking root in neighbouring and other African 
countries and found it difficult to be rooted in pre-genocide Rwanda that was predominantly 
Catholic with 63 % of the population belonging to the RCC. After the genocide, however, the 
Pentecostal Churches have found a way into Rwanda (Newhouse 2011:1-2).   
Rwandan Churches before the genocide were the mainline Churches tainted by the genocide 
bloodbath. Consequently, after the genocide, there has been a change in the religious 
landscape (Kubai 2007:3). Kubai also asserts that the new Churches have contributed to 
creating new identities in post-genocide Rwandan society.  
 
Post-genocide Rwanda faced with tasks of healing and reconciliation, has been flooded with 
new Pentecostal Churches mostly established by exiled returnees from English speaking East 
African countries (Kubai 2007:1-2). This has helped in creating new identities for English- 
speaking Rwandese and those who are not English speaking, thus making reconciliation 
difficult (Kubai 2007:16). These new Churches have strong links with international 
Churches, Church-based organisations and prominent individual Christians; and this 
contributes to global networks (Kubai 2007:10). Kubai (2007:16) in her study thus concludes 
that:  
...the churches are yet to find the means to overcome the prevailing challenges to 
reconciliation and healing in Rwanda. The appropriation of the rhetoric of reconciliation 
and evangelisation with the emphasis on forgiveness as a way “of seeking God's face” 
and individual salvation, without addressing the complexities of the whole reconciliation 
enterprise: the different layers, the pain that the survivors have to live with, the social 
cleavages in this deeply wounded and fractured society, has not yielded the much needed 
reconciliation. Normally, reconciliation is a long and tedious process; it is unlikely to be 
achieved simply through orchestrated religious events and preaching “crusades”. 
 
The new Pentecostal Churches established by the exiled returnees did not want to be part of 
the old Pentecostal Churches (those that existed before the genocide), firstly because the 
returnees spoke English while the other Pentecostals who stayed in the county spoke French; 





believed participated in the genocide (Kubai 2007:210). Divides based on cultural differences 
thus are manifest in the new Pentecostal Churches. 
 
Unity in terms of ethnicity is thus still a challenge in Pentecostal Churches, not only in the 
newly established Pentecostal churches but also in the Association of Pentecostal Churches 
that existed since before the genocide. The Association of Pentecostal Churches in Rwanda 
(ADEPR) comprised all Pentecostal Churches before the genocide. However after the 
genocide, due to numerous new Pentecostal Churches that were established; the ADEPR    
became one Pentecostal Church and retained the name because it had many branches across 
the country (ADEPR 2013:1).On 16 September 2012, The Sunday Times reported that the 
legal representative of the ADEPR was fired by the Rwandan Government Board. This 
happened in the midst of problems in the leadership of the ADPER that were threatening to 
lead to the splitting of the Association. Each group of the partition in the ADPER accused the 
other of harbouring genocide ideologies (Mbonyinshuti 201215). 
An Anglican Bishop, John Rucyahana who heads the National Unity and Reconciliation 
Commission (NRUC) was interviewed by journalists of the Sunday Times, and commented 
as follows:  
We met ADEPR top leaders and those who were expelled from the 
church. We also wrote to them advising them to solve their internal 
conflicts. The commission gives advice to unify and reconcile people 
or groups in conflict, but when we fail, we report the case to other 
institutions. Now the case is in local government  
 
Reconciliation within the churches continues to be a challenge, not only in Pentecostal 
Churches but also throughout the mainline churches. As there are plenty of sources on the 
Church’s involvement in Rwandan history and its complicity in the 1994 genocide, such as: 
Genocide in Rwanda: Complicity of the Churches? edited by Rittner Roth and Whitworth; 
The Angels have left us: The Rwanda Tragedy and the Churches by Hugh McCullum (1995); 
In God’s name: Genocide and Religion in the Twentieth Century edited by Omer Bartov and 
Phyllis Mack (2001); The Churches and Ethnic Ideology in the Rwandan Crisis 1900-1994 
by Gatwa (2005); The Palace, The Parish and the Power: Church-State Relations in Rwanda 
and the Genocide by Raymond Kumalo (2007) and many others. As mentioned above under 
                                                          





1.2.2.4, The Complicity of the Church, after the genocide, great attention in research has been 
on the complicity of Churches in the genocide.  
With regards to the role of the Churches after the genocide; in their book The Mirror to the 
Church: Resurrecting Faith after Genocide in Rwanda Katongole Emmanuel and Hartgroves 
Wilson- express concern that the Churches in post-genocide Rwanda have joined the 
Government in their determination to rebuild Rwanda’s economy by implementing the 
Government’s “Vision 2020.” Churches and NGOs have joined this goal by offering micro-
finance, telecommunications and health care with very little reference to the resurrection of 
the Churches (Katongole and Wilson-Hartgroves 2009:167). 
This is reflected in the two mainline Churches, the RCC Church as discussed below, and the 
Anglican Church. The Anglican Church –some of whose  leaders have also been  convicted 
of working together with the pre-genocide government in the acts of the genocide, seems to 
have taken on a new look after the genocide. (Katongole and Wilson-Hartgroves 2009: 133) 
reflect on the testimony of the former Archbishop of the Anglican Church of Rwanda, Kolini 
Emmanuel, who had returned from exile in the Congo where he grew up. He returned after 
the genocide to become a leader of the Anglican Church. His experience with the Church was 
that the Church had been involved in the killing. Kolini has apologised on behalf of the 
Anglican Church of Rwanda (Underson 200316).  
According to Cantrell Phillip (2007:6), the Anglican Church of Rwanda, with the support of 
international aid, has been tackling issues of reconciliation. However, the Church’s 
relationship with the Rwandan State shares disturbing parallels with the Church-State 
relationship of the pre-genocide government. This is because the Anglican Church in post-
genocide Rwanda has become dominated by members of one ethnic group. (Cantrell 
2009:10). After the genocide some of the clergy were killed and others participated in the 
killing, and fled the country at the end of the genocide. Others faced justice and were jailed. 
Many new clergy, mainly Tutsis, who were exiled before the genocide, from the 
neighbouring countries, took up posts. Moreover, the Tutsi population has preferred the 
Anglican Church due to their mistrust of the RCC for its leading role in the genocide and its 
clear alliance with the pre-genocide Hutu government (Cantrell 2009:10).  
                                                          





Mugabe Grace refers to the current Anglican Archbishop, Onesphore Rwaje, stating that 
“The Church is committed to working around the clock with the government for the good of 
the nation. We are expressing our total commitment to the development of the country 
through promotion of unity and reconciliation” (Mugabe 200617).  
However, although this is the case, with the exception of the RCC, the Church, including the 
Anglican Churches have made a rightful start with ecclesial reconstruction in the context of 
Rwandan Churches after the genocide. This start is of repentance. Since the Churches went 
against its faith by participating in a history of civil hatred and violence, the first step towards 
reconstruction after the genocide was repentance. Gatwa, who until recently (mid 2013) has 
been the general secretary of the Council of Protestant Churches in Rwanda (CPR), indicates 
that both the CPR and the All African Conference of Churches (AACC) have invited member 
Churches to publicly confess their failure, action and omissions during the development of 
the ideology of the genocide (2005:221).  
 
The feelings of many Protestants in general were that “we are a generation of people who 
failed. We need new people to help the Churches be transformed” (Gatwa 2005:222). Public 
repentance of the Churches in Rwanda after the genocide is important because, as pointed out 
by an Anglican pastor, Antoine Rutayisire, who has been teaching reconciliation since the 
end of the genocide, the Churches in Rwanda has to apologise because it took part in the 
unjust system as an institution and because the Churches were silent when evil was being 
committed (Cited in Anderson 2013). Besides a concern of repentance, however, regarded as 
the first point of reconstruction of the Churches in Rwanda after the genocide, according to 
the awareness of the researcher, none of the Churches has attempted constructing a relevant 
theology that matches the post-genocide context. Therefore, perhaps the spirit and drive of 
Mugambi as reflected in his theology of reconstruction has not been yet fully realised by the 
Churches in post-genocide Rwanda.      
 
4.2.1 Detmold Confession: A role model for reconstruction for the Churches in post-
genocide Rwanda   
A group of Rwandan Church leaders and Christian lay persons from various denominations 
including Catholic priests and nuns gathered in Detmold Germany together with Christians 
from elsewhere, including Western Christians, from the 7th to the 12th of  December 1996; to 
                                                          





pray for  and reflect on the Rwandan ethnic crisis. The group came to the conclusion that 
Rwandans would never be reconciled unless each party agreed to ask for forgiveness from 
their victims (cited in Gatwa 2005:231).  
Those who were present from the Hutu ethnic background wrote up a confession which reads 
as follows:  
We, Hutu Christians, present at Detmold, recognise that our group has oppressed the 
Tutsi in various ways since 1959. We confess to the massacre committed by the Hutu 
against the Tutsi group at different periods of Rwandan history, culminating in the 
genocide of 1994. We are ashamed of the horrors and atrocities committed by the Hutu 
towards the Tutsi: torturing, raping, slitting pregnant women open, hacking humans to 
pieces, burying people alive, hunting people with dogs as if they were animals, killing in 
Churches and temples [previously recognised as places of refuge], massacring old 
people, children and the sick in hospitals, forcing people to kill their own relatives, 
burning people alive, denying burial and thousands of other ways of cynically degrading 
and mockingly putting to death. We carry the terrible weight of this unspeakable crime 
and we accept to bear the consequences without resentment. We implore our Hutu 
brothers and sisters not to forget this terrible past when they judge the present reality in 
Rwanda. We humbly ask forgiveness of God and our Tutsi brothers and sisters for all the 
evil we have inflicted upon them. We commit ourselves to do whatever we can to restore 
our honour and dignity and to regain the lost humanity in their eyes (cited in Gatwa 
2005:231).  
 
On the other hand, those who were present from the Tutsi background, after declaring 
themselves comforted by the confession and request for forgiveness made by their Hutu 
counterparts, also confessed and repented as follows:  
We, Tutsi Christian, present at Detmold, are happy and feel comforted by the confession 
and demand of forgiveness made by our brothers and sisters. We likewise ask God and 
the Hutu to forgive the repression and blind vengeance which members of our group 
have taken, surpassing all claims to legitimate self-defence. “Inkoni ikubise mukeba 
uyirenza urugo” [justifying evil on the pretext that it affects a rival, ends up by turning 
back on the person who justified it]. We also ask God and our Hutu brothers and sisters 
forgiveness for certain arrogant and contemptuous attitudes shown to them throughout 







The western Christians present in the group repented of their sense of superiority, judging 
and generalising people as bad, and also repented on behalf of their countries for delivering 
arms to all parties (Gatwa 2005:232).  
Gatwa (2005:233-234) articulates that these confessions provoked many responses, both 
negative and positive. These included a response from the prime minister. 
Although this involved only a number of Rwandan Church leaders and lay Christians, it 
reflects an ecumenical spirit and commitment to a vision of change in the Rwandan post-
genocide context. This is a reflection of evident personal reconstruction; from which internal 
reconstruction of the Churches begin. These confessions also demonstrate a realisation of a 
wakeup call that is reflected in theology of reconstruction. It is a step to ownership of 
responsibility, a rejection of past detrimental tools of construction and a preparation of a solid 
foundation of reconstruction as far as Rwandan post-genocide context is concerned. In brief, 
these confessions are a model of a good example that the Churches can give to the post-
genocide nation.                  
                       
4.3 The RCC18  
 
4.3.1 Inner reconstruction and social involvement  
 
With the RCC after the genocide considering its history, reconstruction had to begin from 
within the Church itself. As highlighted in the first chapter, Rwandan pre-genocide history 
cannot be told separately from that of the RCC. The RCC was considered to be the state 
Church from the colonial era to the end of the 1994 genocide. The leadership in the RCC and 
the state during this period worked hand in hand and had a leading role in the atrocities 
committed in the genocide. For example, the former Archbishop of Kigali, Vincent 
Nsengiyunva was a member President Habyarimana’s inner circle prior to 1994. Three 
Catholic priests have been on trial at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
together with at least six other Catholic clergy (Fast and McGrew 2005:20).  
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However, it is important to note also that although many leaders of the RCC chose to become 
involved in the bloodshed of many Church members, the genocide is an event through which 
the elements of personal reconstruction is demonstrated in the RCC. Some individuals in the 
RCC stood by their Christian faith without counting the cost, one such being Sister Felicitee 
Niyitegeka who is regarded as a heroine   after the genocide. She worked in the remote area 
of Gisenyi were she cared for children of whom most were Tutsis.  
At the breakout of the genocide, she helped many Tutsis to flee across the border and kept 
over thirty people at her home. When militia men discovered the people who were hiding at 
her home, she was told that she would be spared but everyone else at her home was going to 
be killed. However, she was also killed after watching the massacre of all that were in her 
care by the militia men; because she refused to waver from her position that her household 
should stay together, whether in life or in death (Katongole and Wilson-Hartgroves 
2009:117-118); Father Sibomana of Saint Paul Pastoral Centre in Kigali who risked his life 
by keeping Tutsis in his parish and speaking out against the human abuse of the genocide 
(Katongole and Wilson-Hartgroves 2009:119).   
Instances such as these holds hope for the life of the Church, particularly in the midst of the 
general failure of the Churches to stand by the Christian truth. The main criticism of the RCC 
after the genocide has been that the Church has resented apologising as an institution for its 
role in the ethnic ideology and genocide. As Katongole and Wilson-Hartgroves (2009:102) 
point out, in August 1994 twenty-nine Catholic priests wrote a letter to the Pope, in which 
they denied Hutu responsibility for the genocide. These priests blamed the RPF for having 
caused the genocide, and stated that having been blinded by the RPF discourse; the secular 
international community had plotted against the RCC.  
The letter also claimed that the RPF was killing the original population and populating Kigali 
with foreigners, thus making it impossible for them to return to Rwanda (Hoyweghen 
1996:395). During late 1996, the repudiation of the RCC to apologise as an institution was 
influenced by the former Pope’s stand. “The Church in itself cannot be held responsible for 
the misdeeds of its members, who have acted against evangelical law” (The New York 
Times: March 21 1996).   
Pope John Paul II stated in his letter addressed to Rwandan Church leaders, civil authorities 
and the rest of the population (The New York Times: March 21 1996); meaning that the RCC 





He asserted that “All the members of the Church who have sinned during the genocide must 
have the courage to bear the consequences of the deeds that they have committed against God 
and against their future” (The New York Times: March 21 1996). He went on to urge the 
Church in Rwanda to set an example for reconciliation (The New York Times: March 21 
1996). He also made himself heard as the news of killing in Rwanda broke out. On 9 April 
1994, the Pope released a message to the Catholics in Rwanda, pleading with them “not to 
give way to feelings of hatred and revenge but to courageously practice dialogue and 
forgiveness”... At the tragic stage of the life of your country, be builders of love and peace” 
(Agenzia Fides 2004:1). During the gathering of the bishops for Africa on the 10 April 1994 
in which Rwandan bishops were absent due to the genocide taking place, the Pope expressed 
his anguish with the killings in Rwanda stating that:  
With you gathered here for this African Synod and in spiritual communion with the 
Bishops of Rwanda unable to be with us today, I feel it is my duty to appeal to people to 
stop the homicidal hand of the violent. With you I raise my voice to say to all: Enough 
with this violence! Enough with tragedies! Enough with fratricidal slaughter! (Agenzia 
Fides 2004:1). 
Pope John Paul II was among the first leaders in the world to state that what was going on in 
Rwanda was “genocide” (The media Project 2013:1). Due to the history of the Church in 
Rwanda, however, The RCC after the genocide has taken on a new image. Hoyweghen 
(1996:395) long after the end of genocide, referring to the RCC, states that the fall of the pre-
genocide state was simultaneously the fall of the Clerical state. He continues to say that the 
hierarchy of the Church was visibly divided between the Church leaders in exile (refugee 
camps) and those inside the country. In 1995, two hundred priests were in the country trying 
to find a place in the new Rwanda, while sixty were suffering with their congregates in the 
refugee camps in the Congo (Hoyweghen 1996:395).  
Those who had remained in the country were indifferent to those in the refugee camps; they 
wrote a letter, opposing the one that was written by those in the refugee camp to the Pope, 
which denied Hutu responsibility in the genocide. They stated that these priests in the Congo, 
mostly if not all, had participated in the massacre of people within their own parishes in 
Rwanda. Therefore, the latter declared that the legitimate RCC of Rwanda is in Rwanda. The 
letter added that any intervention concerning the priests in exile had to be taken up within the 





Some priests in exile were being accused of having played a major role in the massacre of 
persons in their parishes, such as father Munyeshyaka. The RCC Church, however, RCC is 
generally criticised of not being much concerned about individual cases, neither with its 
credibility with regards to its mass accusation of playing part in the genocide. The Church is 
with the opinion that these accusations are part of the world wide project of defamation 
aimed to discredit the RCC (Hoyweghen 1996:396-396).  
Fast and McGrew elaborate three phases through which the Church developed since the end 
of the genocide. The first phase (1994-1997) was a period of tension between the Church and 
the State (Fast and McGrew 2005:13). This tension was renewed by the letter that the 
Catholic bishops wrote to the government in May 1995 during the closing of the refugee 
camps. The bishops were criticizing the climate in the government. The message complained 
of insecurities, intimidation, assassinations and unfair imprisonments. The massage requested 
for better conditions for collaboration between the Church and the State in the process of 
reconstructing the country (Fast and McGrew 2005:18).  
The second phase (1997-2000) was a period of recovery in which the RCC began 
preparations for the synod on the problem of ethnicity and the Jubilee 2000. The Church was 
aware of the involvement of its members in the genocide. The Bishop’s 1997 New Year’s 
message was also well received as it addressed the aspirations of the Church for 
reconciliation based on a search for peace, tolerance, truth, justice, charity and the 
elimination of ethnicity and regionalism. However, the arrest of Bishop Augustin Misago in 
April 1999 awakened tension between the RCC and the government. Bishop Misago was 
accused of being involved in the genocide, and of neglecting persons who were seeking 
refuge (Fast and McGrew 2005:13). In the third phase (2000-2005), although the tension 
between the Church and the government did not end, there was an improvement as the 
Church showed support to the Gacaca judiciary courts (Rwandan traditional courts), and the 
government realised the need to incorporate the Church in the courts (Fast and McGrew 
2005:14).   
Although the RCC’s credibility is being challenged in post-genocide Rwanda, it is still in a 
good position to assist Rwandans to move forward. Although numerous individuals have 
deserted the Church after the genocide, 50% of the population are still congregants of the 
Church. Moreover, the Church has an extensive network of institutions and structures across 





The year 2000 was an important one in which two major events occurred. These were the 
extra-ordinary synod, and the Jubilee celebration of Jesus Christ’s birth and a hundred years 
of Christianity in Rwanda (Fast and McGrew 2005:19). In preparation for these events, the 
RCC faced critical moments of self-evaluation. The Church could not participate in the 
events without reflecting on issues of ethnicity, divisionalism and the role of the Church. The 
Bishops therefore established an extraordinary synod at diocesan level on the problem of 
ethnicity. The pastoral letter of November 1998 invited all Rwandan Catholics at all levels of 
each diocese to participate in the synod and the Jubilee celebration (Fast and McGrew 
2005:19). These were significant events in which the Church with some external experts 
dared to talk about problems of ethnicity that are paralysing Rwandan society. 
The Bishops’ message for the opening of the Jubilee asked for pardon for “those who were 
guilty of the murder that characterised the country. Those guilty of lying, those involved in 
pillage and destruction, physical and moral torture, and those who were indifferent in the face 
of the misfortune of others” (Fast and McGrew 2005:19). This message is said to be the 
closest to an apology by the Church for its role in the genocide although it stopped short of 
apologising for any wrong-doing of the Church as an institution (Fast and McGrew 2005:19).  
In the pastoral letter of 26 January 2001 marking the closing of the synod, the bishops put 
strong emphasis on the need to reconcile and to create a culture of peace.  
 
They called for the end of ethnic divisions, listening to the suffering of one another, stopping 
the chain of vengeance, and asked for all to make gestures of reconciliation. This message 
also appealed to  people to reach out to one another, admit to the crimes and sins for which 
perpetrators should ask for pardon, pardon and educate children in reconciliation, and respect 
the dignity of human life ( Cited in Fast and McGrew 2005:19).  
The Bishops’ message in the closing ceremony of the two events included a petition for 
forgiveness from God on behalf of the Catholic lay people and leaders who diverted from the 
nature of God and from the Christian message, by getting involved in the violence committed 
in the genocide (CPER 2001:7).  
The RCC showed undivided support for the Gacaca courts. As reflected in the pastoral letter 
titled “the justice that reconciles.” This letter spoke of the serious commitment of the Church 
to the Gacaca courts. In the letter they expressed their regret that Christians were involved in 





In fact, the Church had initiated the Gacaca courts within the Church some time before the 
government initiated these courts. The meeting that took place after the synod in February 
2002 was known as the “Christian-Gacaca.” In this, other Christian representatives were also 
involved. Christians could meet and tell the truth about what happened in the genocide. 
However, this caused contention with the Government; because the Government pointed out 
that the Church has no executive power (Fast and McGrew 2005:20). As a result, the RCC 
framed the courts as simply being a complementary activity that allowed Catholics to speak 
among themselves as clergy and lay persons within a faith frame work about the problem of 
ethnicity (Rutayisire  2005:10-11).    
Another important event noted in Fast and McGrew (2005)’s research findings, is the 
conference held in March 2004, during the tenth anniversary of the genocide. At this 
conference the archbishop of Kigali addressed the root causes of the genocide, which 
included “economic crisis, social injustice, impunity, unemployment of the youth, and in 
particular, the discrimination and the egoism of a small group that drove the country towards 
chaos” (Fast and McGrew 2005:22). The resolutions formulated at this conference focused on 
the relationship between the Church and the State; the need for new evangelisation, non-
participation in politics and a need for a prophetic courage. That is to say, the need for the 
Church and State to collaborate as two different institutions and for the Church to have the 
courage to raise its voice when there is a misrepresentation of power in defence for the 
dignity of the person, truth and justice (Fast and McGrew 2005:23).  
Another significant event that the RCC was involved in which both the government officials 
and Church leaders that were interviewed in Fast and McGrew (2005)’s study pointed out, 
was the “Peace building among Rwandan Youth project”. This project was funded by the US 
Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration. It lasted from 1998 to 2001, 
and was based in the Butare, Byumba, Kabgayi, and Kigali dioceses.  
The project was implanted through camps, and the activities in the camps included debates, 
sport competitions, organised traditional dances, songs and poetry exhibits. The attendants of 
the camps also “assisted disadvantaged members of the community to build solidarity and 
bring about a changed attitude toward different ethnic, religious, and regional groups” (Fast 
and McGrew 2005:30). Many commented that the results of the activities of the project had a 
great impact on the youth and in communities in terms of peace building, self-acceptance and 





The RCC through the Diocesan Justice and Peace Commission (CDJP) has been involved in 
prison work. The co-ordinators of the CDJP visited the local prisons. The co-ordinators also 
initiated a reconciliation process between the prisoners and genocide survivors whose family 
members were killed by the prisoners (Fast and McGrew 2005:34). The CDJP has assisted 
those who wished to confess their crimes. It also assisted in resolving the domestic problems 
of the prisoners, as many of their wives had been involved in extra-marital relationships 
while their husbands were in prison (Fast and McGrew 2005:34). 
The Episcopal Peace and Justice Commission (CEJP)’s 2003 report stated as follows:  
The animators of Justice and Peaces (sic) Commission decided to work intensely to 
educate the population in order to prepare them for a good cohabitation with the released 
prisoners. They warned people to avoid any possible conflict that may arise from the 
encounter of these released prisoners with the population in the villages. To this effect 
they organised several meetings and conferences in the in the villages and in Ecclesial 
Community Bases for different categories of the population, such as the youth, the 
adults, the members of different Catholic Movements, and of the structures of Justice and 
Peaces (sic). They exhorted people to forgive one another, to accept the presidential 
decree to release the prisoners who have confessed their crimes, because it has been 
taken in the spirit of the common good. In these meetings, possible causes of conflicts 
that can oppose the released prisoners to the population in the villages have been 
identified. Everybody felt concerned and was asked to make a contribution. The 
animators of Justice and Peaces (sic) asked the population to try to integrate the released 
prisoners in the social activities that gather such as the works of fields in common, 
family’s (sic) events, prayer gatherings, the public meetings, the economic and other 
social activities. If need be, they asked the population to take legal proceedings rather 
than seek revenge.   
 
The Church also played a role in training people from the grass roots, about the rule of law. 
The most experienced dioceses in civic training were Nyundo, Ruhengeri, Byumba and 
Cyangugu. The training focussed on the rights of women and laws regarding family matters. 
As a result of the paralegal training and interventions, the number of illegal arrests and 
detentions had decreased, and the paralegals were able to help their community members 
learn about and decide where best to take their grievances and issues. Their actions also 





One protestant Church leader who was interviewed in Fast and McGrew 2005’s study 
commented that the RCC is more advanced in terms of community involvement “in terms of 
its work outside of Sunday morning.” (Fast and McGrew 2005:39).  
In terms of working with other Churches and faith communities, the RCC is not part of the 
body of Protestant Churches in Rwanda (CPR). However, the Church’s youth programmes 
are inclusive of all youth regardless of their religion. The process of bible translation into 
Kinyarwanda,19  which had begun before the genocide, was also an event that brought the 
Churches together. Another Inter-faith forum, of which the RCC is part of, is the Inter-Faith 
Commission on Reintegration and Rehabilitation (IFCR). This forum includes Protestants, 
Catholics and Muslims and they provide funding for small projects to assist vulnerable 
groups by building houses for the survivors and provide opportunities for prisoners and 
survivors to work together (Fast and McGrew 2005:40).  
 
In spite of the Church’s efforts in social work in Rwanda after the genocide, however, there 
still remain uneasy feelings between the Church and the post-genocide government. Many 
critics of the Church feel that the Church was closely related to the government that planned 
and carried out the genocide (Fast and McGrew 2005:48). With this criticism, however, the 
Church, after the genocide, has deliberately made an effort to work independently from the 
Government after the genocide. Again, critics could interpret this as a deliberate attempt by 
the RCC to distance itself from the government that stopped the genocide, and since 
approximately 95% of the clergy are Hutu (Fast and McGrew 2005:40).      
The RCC after the genocide to an extent still has a negative image. For example, in January 
2004 an investigation about a massacre in Gikongoro and the propagation of genocide 
ideology in the country held several accusations against the RCC some of them being that the 
Church had not denounced persons who participated in the genocide and that the Church has 
not acknowledged its role in propagating genocide ideologies in Rwanda (Fast and McGrew 
2005:49). On 16 May 2011, the Rwanda Bureau of Information and Broadcasting 
(ORINFOR) publicised the fact that the RCC never admits to the truth and that it has a 
culture of impunity regarding its leaders. It pointed out that it has not admitted and 
apologised for its negative involvement in the history of Rwandan society. It went on to say 
that the Church has established its disciplinary system which has not held anyone to account 
while there are many RCC leaders who are not innocent.   
                                                          






Yet for some prominent members of the RCC hierarchy, this call to repentance has been 
perceived as a political agenda aimed at silencing the Churches by forcing the Churches to 
confess to sins, even those they did not commit (Gatwa 2005:228). For them, if they gave the 
required apology, they would be setting a trap for themselves which will prevent them from 
speaking with authority about the evident human rights abuse in the new regime. Gatwa 
(2005:229) refers to the statement made by the Archbishop of Kigali diocese T. Ntihinyurwa 
in 1997 in which he stated that “some politicians want to nail what they consider as the lost 
sheep, at the foot of the wall” meaning that the Church was being pressed to confess so that it 
can lose the power to speak out. For the Archbishop, the Church acknowledged that the 
genocide happened, but that counter-genocide also happened. For this reason, for him it was 
too early to make a confession because this would not help all the parties to mourn their 
victims. “It is only when all understand that a Twa widow is as good as a Tutsi or Hutu 
widow that a confession will make sense” (cited in Gatwa 2005:229-230).          
           
4.3.2 Formal training       
The theology of reconstruction challenges Church leaders to be widely informed in order to 
be contextually relevant. Training within the RCC takes place at diocesan level regarding 
peace and justice. The 2003 topics included communication and reporting skills, 
democratisation and elections. The 2004 topics covered strategic planning, proposal drafting 
and human resource management. Other topics also included in both years were Catholic 
social teaching, peace education, the Gacaca jurisdictions, budget planning, poverty reduction 
strategy and human rights (Fast and McGrew 2005:23). The training also included some 
international experts in the field. By 2005, the Catholic clergy through the Episcopal Justice 
and Peace Commission (CEJP) were receiving training in project proposal development, 
project monitoring and evaluation and project implementation (Fast and McGrew 2005:24).   
Regarding formal education, the RCC in Rwanda is a significant role- player in education. 
Numerous primary and high schools are managed by the Church and subsidised by the 
Government. The Church has eight private high  schools known as Petits Seminairies for 
those who wish to become priests but do not exclude those who have no  intentions to 
become priests  (Fast and McGrew 2005:24). After high school level, there are three private 
Church-owned university level institutions known as Grand Seminairies. The first is a 





and the third is for theological education in Nyakibanda. The Church also has a post-high 
school level for nuns and those who want to join religious orders, located in Butare, and also 
a school that trains primary and high school teachers in religious education. The Church also 
supports several private universities (Fast and McGrew 2005:24). In the formal schools, 
however, there is no peace and justice subjects in their curriculum, apart from  the  Cyangugu 
diocese where the  CDJP has developed a peace education programme at  primary and 
secondary levels  in both Catholic and non-Catholic schools. There are also clubs in all other 
schools for peace and reconciliation and non-violence.  
The interviewees in Fast and McGrew’s study agreed that this curriculum had an impact on 
reducing conflicts, in such a way that the Church asked the Ministry of Education for 
permission to introduce the programme in all curricula for schools (Fast and McGrew 
2005:28). The RCC placed a major focus on peace and justice in training. The training in 
peace and justice between 2002 and 2006 was directed to the top leaders including priests, as 
they had to be healed and trained themselves in order to help others. Individuals who were 
trained, in return trained many youths in the issues of peace and justice (Fast and McGrew 
2005:27). The Church has also regarded the youth as an important group to focus on. The 
Church has initiated peace, justice and reconciliatory programmes in schools. The Church has 
carried out Trauma and Healing Workshops from time to time, and it has ministered these 
through Catholic youth groups such as the Scouts and the Xavier Catholic youth movements 
(Fast and McGrew 2005:29).  
  
4.3.3 Concluding remarks  
 
The theology of reconstruction has guided and shaped of this chapter. Mugambi (1991:33) 
rightly contends that Africa is the most religious continent and it is in this sense that religion 
has the power to cause both social change and damage. This has been evident in Rwanda. The 
genocide and the role of Churches, however, have not stopped Rwanda from being a religious 
country. The challenge reflected in the literature in the general introduction of the Churches 
in Rwanda is that there are challenges within the Churches as far as unity and ethnicity are 
concerned. Within the RCC, although it has lost numerous members due to its role before and 
during the genocide, 50% of the Rwandan population still attends the RCC. The RCC also 





justice, peace and reconciliation. Thus the RCC has the power and the potential to counteract 
its role in the past by being a prophetic voice in post-genocide Rwanda.   
The question of debate raised in this chapter, is whether perhaps the RCC is in a more 
favorable position to be a voice that holds the government and the society accountable to 
justice regarding equal share in political power compared to other Churches. The other 
question is whether the Church tends to take sides as far as ethnicity is concerned or whether 
it is neutral. The Church’s refusal to offer an apology for its role in the past as an institution 
renders the Church’s internal reconstruction questionable. Mugambi bases his reason for a 
change of theology on the political changes in Africa. In the post-genocide Rwandan context, 
this is applicable; because there has been a waking incident were the Churches especially the 
RCC were involved and did not oppose social ills of social divide and atrocities of genocide. 
Post-genocide time is thus a time of radical reconstruction for the Churches in Rwanda, 
especially the RCC.  
According to literature on the RCC, there have been major changes in the Church since the 
genocide. Mugambi also rightly argues that African theologians ought to provide a timely 
theological interpretation. A common error reflected in the literature about the role of the 
Churches in the Rwandan genocide, is the poor theological standards. Perhaps the RCC in 
Rwanda ought to develop a critical and contextually relevant theologies regarding 
reconstruction within the Churches first, and its role in the present social challenges, having 
learnt from the past. According to the researcher’s knowledge, no such theology has been 
developed to date.  
Theology of reconstruction challenges Church leaders to be trained in other disciplines in 
order to be relevant. The RCC has been incorporating other disciplines into its training. 
However, perhaps a more in-depth look at the Rwandan political issue is required by the 
Church. Rwandan politics has been negatively influenced by the political powers or 
leadership. Perhaps the RCC, after the genocide, and in its prophetic role, ought also to 
consider challenges that exist currently in the political parties and the divide in the political 
leadership arena in post-genocide Rwanda. The Church also perhaps ought to consider 
joining forces with other Churches and other faith communities more often for an effective 
social influence that could influence change in both the Rwandan society and in the political 
leadership arena; for a changed attitude such as that which is reflected in the Detmold 





the ways in which Rwanda can reach a lasting and sustainable peace that is currently still 






CONCLUSION OF THE STUDY  
 
5.1 Research methodology  
 
This study has used the qualitative and non-empirical method by reviewing various available 
literature on the subject.  
5.2 The State of Democracy in Post-Genocide Rwanda  
 
The problem that the study has found with regards to democracy in Rwanda is that every 
government is labelled with one of the two historical rival ethnic groups, namely the Hutus 
and Tutsis; once the government is controlled by one group, the other group becomes 
uncomfortable. Rwandan history began with the Tutsi kings in leadership. Many sources have 
commented that the Tutsi leadership at the time, backed by the population of Tutsi elites 
excluded the Hutu population from power. When the colonisers arrived they worked hand in 
hand with the RCC to rule through the Tutsis. The Europeans claimed that the Tutsis were 
naturally superior to the Hutus and thus more suited for leadership.  
The RCC supported education for the Tutsi sons in all the areas of social life, while the Hutus 
could only be trained in seminaries to serve in the Church. Values that came with the 
establishment of the United Nations and the Tutsis longing for liberation from colonialism 
caused both the Belgian colonisers and the RCC to shift their favour from the Tutsis to the 
Hutus because the Hutus were the majority and were thus viewed as having been oppressed. 
The first “republic” government after the end of colonialism thus was Hutu. The first 
president, Grégoire Kayibanda, was assassinated, and after, his position was overtaken by the 
military commander, Juvenal Habyarimana, who intended for more promotion of Hutu 
power. With Hutu power driving the government, anger was vented on the Tutsi population, 
and the Tutsis were killed in 1959, 1963 and 1973. Numerous Tutsis went into exile in the 
neighbouring countries, where they struggled to survive as they were not accepted nor 
welcome in foreign communities. Eventually, a group of Tutsis refugees and some Hutus 





formed a political organisation RPF, based in Uganda at the time, to advocate for the return 
of the Rwandans in exile. President Habyarimana responded by saying that there was not 
enough space in the country for them to return. However, after the discussions between the 
Rwandan Government and the RPF, assisted by the United Nations in Arusha, Tanzania, 
President Habyarimana had agreed to sign a peace accord of power-sharing between the 
Government and the RPF. Meanwhile, President Habyarimana was shot and killed while 
returning from signing the peace accord. Directly after the death of the president the ethnic 
violence reached its climax in the genocide that killed more than 800,000 Tutsis and 
moderate Hutus. The genocide ceased when the RPF took over the government in July 1994.  
This brief historical background which introduced the context of the study was followed by 
an assessment of the state of democracy in post-genocide Rwanda, using the consensual 
democracy of Kwasi Wiredu as the theoretical framework.  
The post-genocide Government is different because it abolished Rwandan identity based on 
ethnicity. It promotes equality of all Rwandans and national development. However, this 
government is regarded as a Tutsi government.  
The state of democracy in post-genocide Rwanda has been assessed in this study. The 
literature has shown two opposing sides with regards to the state of democracy. Comments of 
a number of scholars have been considered, arguing that Rwanda is a one-party state led by 
the RPF. There is organised opposition against the government. The opposition mainly 
consists of Hutus but also of Tutsis who are in conflict with the government. The opposition 
agrees with the scholarly comments that there is no democracy in post-genocide Rwanda. On 
the contrary, the current constitution is based on the values of democracy.  
Rwanda, however, has a political party forum in which political parties operate on the basis 
of consensus. This forum does not include opposition political parties from the government’s 
opposition. Consensual democracy in post-genocide Rwanda is different from that of Kwasi 
Wiredu, in that Rwandan democracy is a multi-party one while Wiredu’s consensual 
democracy, drawn from the Ashantis in Ghana, is a non-party democracy; where parties refer 
to the stages of government starting from the smallest social unit. The study thus raises a 
point of debate, whether the consensual democracy of Kwasi Wiredu could be an alternative 






5.3 Post-Genocide Churches (RCC) and Theology of Reconstruction  
The historical role of the Church has been discussed briefly. It revealed that the missionaries, 
mainly Catholics, worked hand in hand with colonialists in Rwanda. This collaboration 
intensified the divisions between the Hutus and Tutsis, the two main Rwandan ethnic groups 
of the three that have been in conflict with each other throughout Rwandan history. This 
hatred between the two groups climaxed in 1994 in a genocide that was intended to annihilate 
all Tutsis, and that killed more than 800,000 people in 100 days.  
The Churches did not condemn this evil that was being perpetrated, instead they participated. 
It has been said that more people were killed in Church buildings than elsewhere. Numerous 
Church leaders have been convicted of the crimes against humanity committed in the 
genocide. The RCC has been the one most involved in working with the state, and Protestant 
Churches also did not stand up against the violence, and many Protestant Church leaders have 
also been convicted of having participated in the genocide. The Churches thus betrayed the 
trust of the Rwandans in the genocide and in history leading to it.  
In post-genocide Rwanda, although the RCC has remained the largest denomination, many 
have left the Church due to its involvement in the genocide. The leadership of the other large 
denomination, the Anglican Church, is said to have changed and have become Tutsi 
dominated and aligned with the government.  
After the genocide, Pentecostal Churches in the neighbouring countries without finding a way 
in Catholic dominated pre-genocide Rwanda have now found a way; having brought along by 
the returnees from the neighbouring countries after the genocide. There have been problems 
with the new Churches’ mixing and working together with Church members who had 
remained in the country or who came from different countries of exile. This has been due to 
language and cultural differences. Also Church members from exile felt aggrieved towards 
the Church because it took part in the genocide atrocities.    
The theology of reconstruction of Jesse Mugambi was chosen as a theoretical framework to 
assess the post-genocide Rwandan Church. The theology of reconstruction holds African 
theologians responsible to reshape theology for their own contexts and to respond to the 
issues that affect the society they live in. It also challenges African theologians to be 
informed in all fields of social life in order to be able to respond appropriately to the context. 





theology involves reading the context through the Scriptures. The section of the study on the 
Churches has provided introductory comments about the Churches in general; and has 
proceeded by focusing on the RCC, which is still the most prominent church in Rwanda. The 
Church has been actively involved in promoting justice, peace and reconciliation. The 
Church’s refusal to offer an apology as an institution however, makes its internal 
reconstruction questionable. The Churches have also not attempted to develop a contextually 
relevant theological stand. The Churches have yet to speak out against the friction that exists 
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